Optimal Equilibria of the Best Shot Game
We consider any network environment in which the “best shot game” is played. This is the case where the possible actions are only two for every node (0 and 1), and the best response for a node is 1 if and only if all her neighbors play 0. A natural application of the model is one in which the action 1 is the purchase of a good, which is locally a public good, in the sense that it will be available also to neighbors. This game will typically exhibit a great multiplicity of equilibria. Imagine a social planner whose scope is to find an optimal equilibrium, i.e. one in which the number of nodes playing 1 is minimal. To find such an equilibrium is a very hard task for any non-trivial network architecture. We propose an implementable mechanism that, in the limit of infinite time, reaches an optimal equilibrium, even if this equilibrium and even the network structure is unknown to the social planner.
|Date of creation:||May 2009|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Corso Magenta, 63 - 20123 Milan|
Web page: http://www.feem.it/
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Matthew Haag & Roger Lagunoff, 2006.
"Social Norms, Local Interaction, And Neighborhood Planning ,"
International Economic Review,
Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 47(1), pages 265-296, February.
- Matthew Haag & Roger Lagunoff, 1999. "Social Norms, Local Interaction, and Neighborhood Planning," Game Theory and Information 9907004, EconWPA.
- Matthew Haag & Roger Lagunoff, 2000. "social Norms, Local Interaction and Neighborhood Planning," Levine's Working Paper Archive 2049, David K. Levine.
- Dunia López-Pintado, 2008.
"The Spread of Free-Riding Behavior in a Social Network,"
Eastern Economic Journal,
Palgrave Macmillan;Eastern Economic Association, vol. 34(4), pages 464-479.
- Dunia Lopez Pintado, 2007. "The Spread of Free-Riding Behavior in a Social Network," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 718.07, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
- Andrea Galeotti & Sanjeev Goyal, 2010. "The Law of the Few," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(4), pages 1468-1492, September.
- Andrea Galeotti & Sanjeev Goyal & Matthew O. Jackson & Fernando Vega-Redondo & Leeat Yariv, 2010. "Network Games," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 77(1), pages 218-244.
- Jack Hirshleifer, 1983. "From weakest-link to best-shot: The voluntary provision of public goods," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 41(3), pages 371-386, January.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:fem:femwpa:2009.33. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (barbara racah)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.