Larger groups may alleviate collective action problems
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- Sung Ha Hwang, 2009. "Larger groups may alleviate collective action problems," UMASS Amherst Economics Working Papers 2009-05, University of Massachusetts Amherst, Department of Economics.
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More about this item
KeywordsCollective action; group size; collective punishment; Lanchester?s equation;
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
- D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-11-28 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2011-11-28 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-EVO-2011-11-28 (Evolutionary Economics)
- NEP-HPE-2011-11-28 (History & Philosophy of Economics)
- NEP-SOC-2011-11-28 (Social Norms & Social Capital)
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