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State Capacity of Secret Surveillance

Author

Listed:
  • Thomas K. Duncan

    (Radford University)

  • Nathan P. Goodman

    (Mercatus Center at George Mason University)

Abstract

The state capacity-civil society tradeoff model tends to treat the “state” and “civil society” as separate entities who move to constrain one another. However, this modeling technique leaves out the nuances of individual action within a collective setting by treating each as a relative black box. This article explores this balance in the context of the surveillance state that has arisen in the 20th and 21st century. As state capacity in surveillance increases it better allows the state to respond to threats to citizens from citizens. However, the increased capacity also lessens the ability of societal pressure to check authoritarian advances even in a nation with a thriving civil society presence.

Suggested Citation

  • Thomas K. Duncan & Nathan P. Goodman, 2025. "State Capacity of Secret Surveillance," Eastern Economic Journal, Palgrave Macmillan;Eastern Economic Association, vol. 51(1), pages 27-49, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:pal:easeco:v:51:y:2025:i:1:d:10.1057_s41302-024-00278-1
    DOI: 10.1057/s41302-024-00278-1
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    National security; Surveillance; State capacity; Civil society; Ratchet effect;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
    • F52 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - National Security; Economic Nationalism
    • H56 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - National Security and War

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