The Subgame Perfect Core
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More about this item
KeywordsExtensive game; subgame perfection; characteristic function game; core; centipede game; coalition-proof Nash equilibrium;
- C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
- D0 - Microeconomics - - General
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2016-03-23 (All new papers)
- NEP-GTH-2016-03-23 (Game Theory)
- NEP-HPE-2016-03-23 (History & Philosophy of Economics)
- NEP-MIC-2016-03-23 (Microeconomics)
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