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A Note On The Weak Sequential Core Of Dynamic Tu Games

Author

Listed:
  • HELGA HABIS

    (Department of Economics, Universiteit Maastricht, P.O. Box 616, 6200 MD, Maastricht, The Netherlands)

  • P. JEAN-JACQUES HERINGS

    (Department of Economics, Universiteit Maastricht, P.O. Box 616, 6200 MD, Maastricht, The Netherlands)

Abstract

This paper addresses a problem with an argument in Kranich, Perea, and Peters [2005] supporting their definition of the Weak Sequential Core and their characterization result. We also provide the remedy, a modification of the definition, to rescue the characterization.

Suggested Citation

  • Helga Habis & P. Jean-Jacques Herings, 2010. "A Note On The Weak Sequential Core Of Dynamic Tu Games," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 12(04), pages 407-416.
    • Handle: RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:12:y:2010:i:04:n:s021919891000274x
    DOI: 10.1142/S021919891000274X
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Laurence Kranich & Andrés Perea & Hans Peters, 2005. "Core Concepts For Dynamic Tu Games," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 7(01), pages 43-61.
    2. P. Herings & A. Predtetchinski & A. Perea, 2006. "The Weak Sequential Core for Two-Period Economies," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 34(1), pages 55-65, April.
    3. Predtetchinski, Arkadi & Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Peters, Hans, 2002. "The strong sequential core for two-period economies," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(4), pages 465-482, December.
    4. Ray, Debraj, 1989. "Credible Coalitions and the Core," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 18(2), pages 185-187.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
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    Cited by:

    1. Jean-François Caulier & Michel Grabisch & Agnieszka Rusinowska, 2015. "An allocation rule for dynamic random network formation processes," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 60(2), pages 283-313, October.
    2. Imma Curiel, 2015. "Compensation rules for multi-stage sequencing games," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 225(1), pages 65-82, February.
    3. Chander, Parkash & Wooders, Myrna, 2020. "Subgame-perfect cooperation in an extensive game," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 187(C).
    4. Habis, Helga & Herings, P. Jean-Jacques, 2011. "Transferable utility games with uncertainty," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(5), pages 2126-2139, September.
    5. Habis, Helga, 2012. "Sztochasztikus csődjátékok - avagy hogyan osszunk szét egy bizonytalan méretű tortát? [Stochastic bankruptcy games. How can a cake of uncertain dimensions be divided?]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(12), pages 1299-1310.
    6. Berden, Caroline & Peters, Hans & Robles, Laura & Vermeulen, Dries, 2022. "Strategic transfers between cooperative games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 133(C), pages 77-84.
    7. László Á. Kóczy, 2018. "Partition Function Form Games," Theory and Decision Library C, Springer, number 978-3-319-69841-0, March.
    8. Ehud Lehrer & Marco Scarsini, 2013. "On the Core of Dynamic Cooperative Games," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 3(3), pages 359-373, September.
    9. Parkash Chander & Myrna Wooders, 2016. "The Subgame Perfect Core," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 16-00006, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
    10. Laszlo A. Koczy, 2019. "The risk-based core for cooperative games with uncertainty," CERS-IE WORKING PAPERS 1906, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies.
    11. Routledge, R.R., 2014. "Deviations, uncertainty and the core," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 88(C), pages 286-297.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Cooperative games; dynamic games; core; C71; C73;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • B4 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Economic Methodology
    • C0 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - General
    • C6 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling
    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • D5 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium
    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
    • M2 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Economics

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