Cooperation with Externalities and Uncertainty
We introduce a new class of cooperative games where the worth of a coalition depends on the behavior of other players and on the state of nature as well. we allow for coalitions to form both before and after the resolution of uncertainty, hence agreements must be stable against both types of deviations. The appropriate extension of the classicakl core concept, the Sustainable Core, is defined for this new setup to test the stability of allocations in such a complex environment. A prominent application, a game of consumers and generators on an electrical energy transmission network is examined in details, where the power in- and outlets of the nodes have to be determined in a way, that if any line instantaneously fails, none of the remaining lines may be overloaded. We show that fulfilling this safety requirement in a mutually acceptable way can be achieved by choosing an element in the Sustainable Core.
|Date of creation:||Oct 2012|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: 1112 Budapest, Budaorsi ut 45.|
Phone: (+36-1) 309-2652
Fax: (36-1) 319-3136
Web page: http://econ.core.hu
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Kóczy László Á, 2006.
"A recursive core for partition function form games,"
031, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
- LÃ¡szlÃ³ KÃ³czy, 2007. "A recursive core for partition function form games," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 63(1), pages 41-51, August.
- Bi Chen & William Lam & Agachai Sumalee & Qingquan Li & Hu Shao & Zhixiang Fang, 2013. "Finding Reliable Shortest Paths in Road Networks Under Uncertainty," Networks and Spatial Economics, Springer, vol. 13(2), pages 123-148, June.
- László Á. Kóczy & Dávid Csercsik, 2011.
"Externalities in the games over electrical power transmission networks,"
Working Paper Series
1103, Óbuda University, Keleti Faculty of Business and Management.
- David Csercsik & Laszlo A. Koczy, 2011. "Externalities in the games over electrical power transmission networks," IEHAS Discussion Papers 1125, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences.
- Zhi-Chun Li & William Lam & S. Wong, 2009. "The Optimal Transit Fare Structure under Different Market Regimes with Uncertainty in the Network," Networks and Spatial Economics, Springer, vol. 9(2), pages 191-216, June.
- Helga Habis & P. Jean-Jacques Herings, 2011.
"Core Concepts for Incomplete Market Economies,"
IEHAS Discussion Papers
1119, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences.
- Florian Leuthold & Hannes Weigt & Christian Hirschhausen, 2012. "A Large-Scale Spatial Optimization Model of the European Electricity Market," Networks and Spatial Economics, Springer, vol. 12(1), pages 75-107, March.
- Kleindorfer, Paul R. & Wu, D. -J. & Fernando, Chitru S., 2001. "Strategic gaming in electric power markets," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 130(1), pages 156-168, April.
- Hannes Weigt & Jan Abrell, 2012. "Storage and Investments in a Combined Energy Network Model," EcoMod2012 4319, EcoMod.
- Jan Abrell & Hannes Weigt, 2016.
"Combining Energy Networks,"
CER-ETH Economics working paper series
16/238, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research (CER-ETH) at ETH Zurich.
- Moulin, Herve, 1985. "The separability axiom and equal-sharing methods," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 36(1), pages 120-148, June.
- Ray, Debraj & Vohra, Rajiv, 1997.
"Equilibrium Binding Agreements,"
Journal of Economic Theory,
Elsevier, vol. 73(1), pages 30-78, March.
- Predtetchinski,Arkadi & Herings,Jean-Jacques, 2001.
"The Strong Sequential Core for Two-period Economies,"
005, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
- Predtetchinski, Arkadi & Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Peters, Hans, 2002. "The strong sequential core for two-period economies," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(4), pages 465-482, December.
- P.J.J. Herings & H. Peeters, 2001. "The Strong Sequential Core for Two-period Economies," Microeconomics 0111002, EconWPA.
- Giorgia Oggioni & Yves Smeers & Elisabetta Allevi & Siegfried Schaible, 2012. "A Generalized Nash Equilibrium Model of Market Coupling in the European Power System," Networks and Spatial Economics, Springer, vol. 12(4), pages 503-560, December.
- Ray, Debraj, 1989. "Credible Coalitions and the Core," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 18(2), pages 185-87.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:has:discpr:1229. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Adrienn Foldi)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.