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Core Concepts For Dynamic Tu Games

Author

Listed:
  • LAURENCE KRANICH

    () (Department of Economics, SUNY at Albany, Albany, NY 12222, USA)

  • ANDRÉS PEREA

    () (Department of Quantitative Economics, University of Maastricht, P. O. Box 616, 6200 MD Maastricht, The Netherlands)

  • HANS PETERS

    () (Department of Quantitative Economics, University of Maastricht, P. O. Box 616, 6200 MD Maastricht, The Netherlands)

Abstract

This paper is concerned with the question of how to define the core when cooperation takes place in a dynamic setting. The focus is on dynamic cooperative games in which the players face a finite sequence of exogenously specified TU-games. Three different core concepts are presented: the classical core, the strong sequential core and the weak sequential core. The differences between the concepts arise from different interpretations of profitable deviations by coalitions. Sufficient conditions are given for nonemptiness of the classical core in general and of the weak sequential core for the case of two players. Simplifying characterizations of the weak and strong sequential core are provided. Examples highlight the essential difference between these core concepts.

Suggested Citation

  • Laurence Kranich & Andrés Perea & Hans Peters, 2005. "Core Concepts For Dynamic Tu Games," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 7(01), pages 43-61.
  • Handle: RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:07:y:2005:i:01:n:s0219198905000417
    DOI: 10.1142/S0219198905000417
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Jean-François Caulier & Michel Grabisch & Agnieszka Rusinowska, 2015. "An allocation rule for dynamic random network formation processes," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 60(2), pages 283-313, October.
    2. Germain, M. & Toint, Ph. & Tulkens, H. & de Zeeuw, A.J., 2003. "Transfers to sustain dynamic core-theoretic cooperation in international stock pollutant control," Other publications TiSEM 8953bc6e-fc65-4fd7-a2d1-6, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    3. Habis, Helga & Herings, P. Jean-Jacques, 2011. "Transferable utility games with uncertainty," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(5), pages 2126-2139, September.
    4. Helga Habis & P. Herings, 2013. "Stochastic bankruptcy games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 42(4), pages 973-988, November.
    5. Habis, Helga, 2012. "Sztochasztikus csődjátékok - avagy hogyan osszunk szét egy bizonytalan méretű tortát?
      [Stochastic bankruptcy games. How can a cake of uncertain dimensions be divided?]
      ," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(12), pages 1299-1310.
    6. Jean-François Caulier & Michel Grabisch & Agnieszka Rusinowska, 2015. "An allocation rule for dynamic random network formation," PSE - Labex "OSE-Ouvrir la Science Economique" halshs-01207823, HAL.
    7. repec:wsi:igtrxx:v:12:y:2010:i:04:n:s021919891000274x is not listed on IDEAS
    8. Konstantin Avrachenkov & Laura Cottatellucci & Lorenzo Maggi, 2014. "Confidence Intervals for the Shapley–Shubik Power Index in Markovian Games," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 4(1), pages 10-31, March.
    9. D. Bauso & J. Timmer, 2009. "Robust dynamic cooperative games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 38(1), pages 23-36, March.
    10. Habis Helga & Herings P. Jean-Jacques, 2009. "Cooperation Under Incomplete Contracting," Research Memorandum 026, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
    11. Berden Caroline, 2007. "The Role of Individual Intertemporal Transfers in Dynamic TU-Games," Research Memorandum 030, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
    12. Hellman, Ziv, 2008. "Bargaining Set Solution Concepts in Dynamic Cooperative Games," MPRA Paper 8798, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    13. Germain, Marc & Toint, Philippe & Tulkens, Henry & de Zeeuw, Aart, 2003. "Transfers to sustain dynamic core-theoretic cooperation in international stock pollutant control," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 79-99, October.
    14. Helga Habis & P. Jean-Jacques Herings, 2010. "A Note On The Weak Sequential Core Of Dynamic Tu Games," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 12(04), pages 407-416.
    15. Engwerda, J.C., 2012. "Prospects of Tools from Differential Games in the Study Of Macroeconomics of Climate Change," Discussion Paper 2012-045, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    16. Ehud Lehrer & Marco Scarsini, 2013. "On the Core of Dynamic Cooperative Games," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 3(3), pages 359-373, September.
    17. Parkash Chander & Myrna Wooders, 2016. "The Subgame Perfect Core," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 16-00006, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
    18. Ziv Hellman, 2009. "Bargaining Set Solution Concepts in Repeated Cooperative Games," Discussion Paper Series dp523, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Cooperative games; dynamic games; core; differences; JEL classification: C71; JEL classification: C73;

    JEL classification:

    • B4 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Economic Methodology
    • C0 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - General
    • C6 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling
    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • D5 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium
    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
    • M2 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Economics

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