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Transferable Utility Games with Uncertainty

Author

Listed:
  • Helga Habis

    (Institute of Economics - Hungarian Academy of Sciences)

  • P. Jean-Jacques Herings

    (Department of Economics, Universiteit Maastricht)

Abstract

We introduce the concept of a TUU-game, a transferable utility game with uncertainty. In a TUU-game there is uncertainty regarding the payoffs of coalitions. One out of a finite number of states of nature materializes and conditional on the state, the players are involved in a particular transferable utility game. We consider the case without ex ante commitment possibilities and propose the Weak Sequential Core as a solution concept. We characterize the Weak Sequential Core and show that it is non-empty if all ex post TUgames are convex.

Suggested Citation

  • Helga Habis & P. Jean-Jacques Herings, 2011. "Transferable Utility Games with Uncertainty," CERS-IE WORKING PAPERS 1120, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies.
    • Handle: RePEc:has:discpr:1120
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    Cited by:

    1. Dávid Csercsik & László Á. Kóczy, 2017. "Efficiency and Stability in Electrical Power Transmission Networks: a Partition Function Form Approach," Networks and Spatial Economics, Springer, vol. 17(4), pages 1161-1184, December.
    2. Elena Parilina & Stepan Akimochkin, 2021. "Cooperative Stochastic Games with Mean-Variance Preferences," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 9(3), pages 1-15, January.
    3. Helga Habis & P. Herings, 2013. "Stochastic bankruptcy games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 42(4), pages 973-988, November.
    4. Habis, Helga, 2012. "Sztochasztikus csődjátékok - avagy hogyan osszunk szét egy bizonytalan méretű tortát? [Stochastic bankruptcy games. How can a cake of uncertain dimensions be divided?]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(12), pages 1299-1310.
    5. M. G. Fiestras-Janeiro & I. García-Jurado & A. Meca & M. A. Mosquera, 2020. "On benefits of cooperation under strategic power," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 288(1), pages 285-306, May.
    6. László Á. Kóczy, 2018. "Partition Function Form Games," Theory and Decision Library C, Springer, number 978-3-319-69841-0, December.
    7. repec:hal:pseose:halshs-01207823 is not listed on IDEAS
    8. R. R. Routledge & R. A. Edwards, 2020. "Ambiguity and price competition," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 88(2), pages 231-256, March.
    9. Sinan Ertemel & Rajnish Kumar, 2018. "Proportional rules for state contingent claims," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 47(1), pages 229-246, March.
    10. Donald Nganmegni Njoya & Issofa Moyouwou & Nicolas Gabriel Andjiga, 2021. "The equal-surplus Shapley value for chance-constrained games on finite sample spaces," Mathematical Methods of Operations Research, Springer;Gesellschaft für Operations Research (GOR);Nederlands Genootschap voor Besliskunde (NGB), vol. 93(3), pages 463-499, June.
    11. Kamishiro, Yusuke & Vohra, Rajiv & Serrano, Roberto, 2023. "Signaling, screening, and core stability," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 213(C).
    12. Yang, Jian & Li, Jianbin, 2020. "Cooperative game with nondeterministic returns," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(C), pages 123-140.
    13. Junnosuke Shino & Shinichi Ishihara & Shimpei Yamauchi, 2022. "Shapley Mapping and Its Axiomatizations in n -Person Cooperative Interval Games," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 10(21), pages 1-14, October.
    14. Thomson, William, 2015. "Axiomatic and game-theoretic analysis of bankruptcy and taxation problems: An update," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 74(C), pages 41-59.
    15. Jean-François Caulier & Michel Grabisch & Agnieszka Rusinowska, 2015. "An allocation rule for dynamic random network formation processes," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 60(2), pages 283-313, October.
    16. Laszlo A. Koczy, 2019. "The risk-based core for cooperative games with uncertainty," CERS-IE WORKING PAPERS 1906, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies.
    17. Chatterjee, Siddharth & Ertemel, Sinan & Kumar, Rajnish, 2023. "Rationing rules for risky claims," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 108(C).
    18. David Csercsik, 2013. "Competition and cooperation in a PFF game theoretic model of electrical energy trade," CERS-IE WORKING PAPERS 1310, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies.
    19. Routledge, R.R., 2014. "Deviations, uncertainty and the core," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 88(C), pages 286-297.
    20. Németh, Tibor & Pintér, Miklós, 2017. "The non-emptiness of the weak sequential core of a transferable utility game with uncertainty," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(C), pages 1-6.
    21. Routledge R. R., 2012. "On Communication and the Weak Sequential Core," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 12(1), pages 1-22, September.
    22. Dávid Csercsik, 2016. "Competition and Cooperation in a Bidding Model of Electrical Energy Trade," Networks and Spatial Economics, Springer, vol. 16(4), pages 1043-1073, December.
    23. Berden, Caroline & Peters, Hans & Robles, Laura & Vermeulen, Dries, 2022. "Strategic transfers between cooperative games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 133(C), pages 77-84.

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    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games

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