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Compensation rules for multi-stage sequencing games

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  • Imma Curiel

Abstract

This paper focuses on compensation rules for multi-stage sequencing games. These rules distribute the implicit losses and gains when the players move from one stage of a multi-stage sequencing game to a subsequent stage. They are necessary because allocation rules that yield core elements for the games in each stage are not guaranteed to yield core elements for the multi-stage game. Three approaches to find compensation rules that yield core elements are studied. Two compensation rules that lead to stable division rules for multi-stage sequencing games are found as a result of these approaches. Axiomatic characterizations of these division rules are discussed. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2015

Suggested Citation

  • Imma Curiel, 2015. "Compensation rules for multi-stage sequencing games," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 225(1), pages 65-82, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:annopr:v:225:y:2015:i:1:p:65-82:10.1007/s10479-013-1432-2
    DOI: 10.1007/s10479-013-1432-2
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

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    2. Davila-Pena, Laura & Borm, Peter & Garcia-Jurado, Ignacio & Schouten, Jop, 2023. "An Allocation Rule for Graph Machine Scheduling Problems," Other publications TiSEM 17013f33-1d65-4294-802c-b, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    3. Davila-Pena, Laura & Borm, Peter & Garcia-Jurado, Ignacio & Schouten, Jop, 2023. "An Allocation Rule for Graph Machine Scheduling Problems," Discussion Paper 2023-009, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    4. Yang, Guangjing & Sun, Hao & Hou, Dongshuang & Xu, Genjiu, 2019. "Games in sequencing situations with externalities," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 278(2), pages 699-708.

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