Efficiency in Uncertain Cooperative Games
A contingent contract in a transferable utility game under uncertainty specifies an outcome for each possible state. It is assumed that coalitions evaluate these contracts by considering the minimal possible excesses. A main question of the paper concerns the existence and characterization of efficient contracts. It is shown that they exist if and only if the set of possible coalitions contains a balanced subset. Moreover, a characterization of values that result in efficient contracts in the case of minimally balanced collections is provided.
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- Bossert, Walter & Peters, Hans, 2001.
"Minimax Regret and Efficient Bargaining under Uncertainty,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 34(1), pages 1-10, January.
- Walter Bossert & Hans Peters, "undated". "Minimax Regret and Efficient Bargaining under Uncertainty," Discussion Papers 98/8, University of Nottingham, School of Economics.
- Bossert, Walter & Nosal, Ed & Sadanand, Venkatraman, 1996. "Bargaining under Uncertainty and the Monotone Path Solutions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 14(2), pages 173-189, June.
- Hans Peters & Walter Bossert, 2002. "Efficient solutions to bargaining problems with uncertain disagreement points," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 19(3), pages 489-502.
- Derks, Jean & Peters, Hans, 1998. "Orderings, excess functions, and the nucleolus," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 175-182, September. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)