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Efficiency in Uncertain Cooperative Games

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  • BOSSERT, Walter
  • DERKS, Jean
  • PETERS, Hans

Abstract

A contingent contract in a transferable utility game under uncertainty specifies an outcome for each possible state. It is assumed that coalitions evaluate these contracts by considering the minimal possible excesses. A main question of the paper concerns the existence and characterization of efficient contracts. It is shown that they exist if and only if the set of possible coalitions contains a balanced subset. Moreover, a characterization of values that result in efficient contracts in the case of minimally balanced collections is provided.

Suggested Citation

  • BOSSERT, Walter & DERKS, Jean & PETERS, Hans, 2001. "Efficiency in Uncertain Cooperative Games," Cahiers de recherche 2001-14, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
    • Handle: RePEc:mtl:montde:2001-14
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1866/354
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. F. R. Fernández & M. A. Hinojosa & J. Puerto, 2002. "Core Solutions in Vector-Valued Games," Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, Springer, vol. 112(2), pages 331-360, February.
    2. Bossert, Walter & Nosal, Ed & Sadanand, Venkatraman, 1996. "Bargaining under Uncertainty and the Monotone Path Solutions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 14(2), pages 173-189, June.
    3. Bossert, Walter & Peters, Hans, 2001. "Minimax Regret and Efficient Bargaining under Uncertainty," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 34(1), pages 1-10, January.
    4. Hans Peters & Walter Bossert, 2002. "Efficient solutions to bargaining problems with uncertain disagreement points," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 19(3), pages 489-502.
    5. Derks, Jean & Peters, Hans, 1998. "Orderings, excess functions, and the nucleolus," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 175-182, September.
    6. Lloyd S. Shapley, 1967. "On balanced sets and cores," Naval Research Logistics Quarterly, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 14(4), pages 453-460.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Jean Derks & Hans Peters & Peter Sudhölter, 2014. "On extensions of the core and the anticore of transferable utility games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 43(1), pages 37-63, February.
    2. Habis, Helga & Herings, P. Jean-Jacques, 2011. "Transferable utility games with uncertainty," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(5), pages 2126-2139, September.
    3. Fall, François & Akim, Al-mouksit & Wassongma, Harouna, 2018. "DEA and SFA research on the efficiency of microfinance institutions: A meta-analysis," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 107(C), pages 176-188.
    4. Laszlo A. Koczy, 2019. "The risk-based core for cooperative games with uncertainty," CERS-IE WORKING PAPERS 1906, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies.
    5. Dairo Estrada & Poldy Osorio, 2004. "Effects Of Financial Capital On Colombian Banking Efficiency," Revista ESPE - Ensayos Sobre Política Económica, Banco de la República, vol. 22(47), pages 162-201.
    6. Németh, Tibor & Pintér, Miklós, 2017. "The non-emptiness of the weak sequential core of a transferable utility game with uncertainty," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(C), pages 1-6.

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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General

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