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Bargaining Multiple Issues with Leximin Preferences

Global bargaining problems over a finite number of different issues, are formalized as cartesian products of classical bargaining problems. For maximin and leximin bargainers we characterize global bargaining solutions that are efficient and satisfy the requirement that bargaining separately or globally leads to equivalent outcomes. Global solutions in this class are constructed from the family of monotone path solutions for classical bargaining problems.

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Paper provided by Centro de Estudios Andaluces in its series Economic Working Papers at Centro de Estudios Andaluces with number E2006/05.

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Length: 16 pages
Date of creation: 2006
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cea:doctra:e2006_05
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  1. Bossert, Walter & Peters, Hans, 2000. "Multi-attribute decision-making in individual and social choice," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 40(3), pages 327-339, November.
  2. Thomson, W., 1989. "Cooperative Models Of Bargaining," RCER Working Papers 177, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
  3. Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
  4. Sunil Gupta, 1989. "Modeling Integrative, Multiple Issue Bargaining," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 35(7), pages 788-806, July.
  5. Kalai, Ehud, 1977. "Proportional Solutions to Bargaining Situations: Interpersonal Utility Comparisons," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 45(7), pages 1623-30, October.
  6. repec:cup:cbooks:9780521424585 is not listed on IDEAS
  7. Peters, Hans J M, 1986. "Simultaneity of Issues and Additivity in Bargaining," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(1), pages 153-69, January.
  8. Walter Bossert & Hans Peters, . "Minimax Regret and Efficient Bargaining under Uncertainty," Discussion Papers 98/8, University of Nottingham, School of Economics.
  9. Myerson, Roger B, 1981. "Utilitarianism, Egalitarianism, and the Timing Effect in Social Choice Problems," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 49(4), pages 883-97, June.
  10. Clara Ponsati & Joel Watson, 1998. "Multiple-Issue Bargaining and Axiomatic Solutions," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 26(4), pages 501-524.
  11. Bossert, Walter & Nosal, Ed & Sadanand, Venkatraman, 1996. "Bargaining under Uncertainty and the Monotone Path Solutions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 14(2), pages 173-189, June.
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