Bargaining Multiple Issues with Leximin Preferences
Global bargaining problems over a finite number of different issues, are formalized as cartesian products of classical bargaining problems. For maximin and leximin bargainers we characterize global bargaining solutions that are efficient and satisfy the requirement that bargaining separately or globally leads to equivalent outcomes. Global solutions in this class are constructed from the family of monotone path solutions for classical bargaining problems.
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