IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/mtl/montec/2001-14.html

Efficiency in Uncertain Cooperative Games

Author

Listed:
  • Bossert, W.
  • Derks, J.
  • Peters, H.

Abstract

A contingent contract in a transferable utility game under uncertainty specifies an outcome for each possible state. It is assumed that coalitions evaluate these contracts by considering the minimal possible excesses. A main question of the paper concerns the existence and characterization of efficient contracts.

Suggested Citation

  • Bossert, W. & Derks, J. & Peters, H., 2001. "Efficiency in Uncertain Cooperative Games," Cahiers de recherche 2001-14, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
    • Handle: RePEc:mtl:montec:2001-14
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a
    for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    Other versions of this item:

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Fall, François & Akim, Al-mouksit & Wassongma, Harouna, 2018. "DEA and SFA research on the efficiency of microfinance institutions: A meta-analysis," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 107(C), pages 176-188.
    2. Jean Derks & Hans Peters & Peter Sudhölter, 2014. "On extensions of the core and the anticore of transferable utility games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 43(1), pages 37-63, February.
    3. Habis, Helga & Herings, P. Jean-Jacques, 2011. "Transferable utility games with uncertainty," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(5), pages 2126-2139, September.
    4. Laszlo A. Koczy, 2019. "The risk-based core for cooperative games with uncertainty," CERS-IE WORKING PAPERS 1906, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies.
    5. Dairo Estrada & Poldy Osorio, 2004. "Effects Of Financial Capital On Colombian Banking Efficiency," Revista ESPE - Ensayos Sobre Política Económica, Banco de la República, vol. 22(47), pages 162-201.
    6. Németh, Tibor & Pintér, Miklós, 2017. "The non-emptiness of the weak sequential core of a transferable utility game with uncertainty," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(C), pages 1-6.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ;
    ;

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:mtl:montec:2001-14. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sharon BREWER (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/cdmtlca.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.