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Competition in the Market for Audit Services: The Effect of Supplier Concentration on Audit Fees

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  • TIM PEARSON
  • GREG TROMPETER

Abstract

. This article investigates the relationship between supplier concentration and competition in the market for audit services. The study is motivated by the concern that high levels of concentration may be detrimental, resulting in lower levels of competition, which could harm clients through higher fees and lower levels of service. However, a counterargument is that high levels of concentration may not be detrimental but may result because market leaders display exceptional performance, providing lower†priced audits (perhaps due to economies of scale) and/or enhanced service to clients. We obtained audit fee and financial data on 140 life and health insurance companies and 101 property and casualty insurance companies. Our findings indicate that concentration is negatively associated with fees, suggesting that higher levels of concentration are related to higher levels of price competition (i.e., lower fees). Additionally, we address the validity of concentration as a surrogate for competition by examining competition among the market leaders. Our analysis examines the fees paid by 47 insurance companies that switched auditors during the sample period. We investigate the effect of industry specialization on fees paid by clients that switch auditors, finding evidence of significant fee cutting among market leaders for each others' clients but no evidence of fee reductions for clients switching from nonleaders to market leaders. This is consistent with the claim that there is significant price competition for clients among the market leaders, suggesting that high concentration need not result in low levels of price competition (i.e., higher fees). Résumé. Les auteurs analysent la relation entre la concentration des fournisseurs et la coocurrence sur le marché des services de vérification. L'étude découle de la préoccupation suivant laquelle des niveaux élevés de concentration pourraient être préjudiciables et donner lieu à une intensité plus faible de la concurrence qui risquerait de léser les clients, en augmentant les honoraires et en diminuant la qualité du service. L'argumentation opposée veut qu'un degré élevé de concentration ne soit pas préjudiciable et puisse être attribuable au fait que les chefs de file du marché affichent une performance exceptionnelle, offrant des services de vérification à meilleur prix (peut†être en raison d'économies d'échelle) et (ou) mettent l'accent sur le service à la clientèle. Les auteurs ont recueilli des données relatives aux honoraires de vérification et des données financières provenant de 140 sociétés d'assurances vie et maladie et 101 sociétés d'assurances I.A.R.D. (incendie, accidents et risques divers). Les résultats de leurs recherches indiquent que la concentration est en relation négative avec les honoraires, ce qui donne à penser que des niveaux plus élevés de concentration sont reliés à des niveaux plus élevés de concurrence relative au prix (c'est†à †dire à des honoraires inférieurs). Les auteurs se sont également penchés sur la validité de la concentration à titre de substitut à la concurrence en examinant la concurrence que se livraient les chefs de file sur le marché. Ils ont analysé les honoraires versés par 47 sociétés d'assurance qui ont changé de vérificateurs au cours de la période analysée. Us ont étudié l'incidence de la spécialisation sectorielle sur les honoraires versés par les clients qui changent de vérificateurs; les résultats de l'étude démontrent que les cabinets chefs de file réduisent leurs honoraires de façon appréciable à l'intention des clients de leurs concurrents appartenant au groupe des chefs de file; ces résultats ne permettent cependant pas de conclure à des réductions d'honoraires pour les clients qui passent de vérificateurs n'appartenant pas aux chefs de file à des vérificateurs chefs de file sur le marché. Ces constatations sont conformes à l'hypothèse selon laquelle les chefs de file sur le marché se livrent une âpre concurrence relative au prix pour attirer la clientèle, ce qui laisse croire que la concentration élevée ne donne pas nécessairement lieu à une faible intensité de la concurrence relative au prix (c'est†à †dire à des honoraires supérieurs).

Suggested Citation

  • Tim Pearson & Greg Trompeter, 1994. "Competition in the Market for Audit Services: The Effect of Supplier Concentration on Audit Fees," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 11(1), pages 115-135, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:wly:coacre:v:11:y:1994:i:1:p:115-135
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1911-3846.1994.tb00439.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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