The museum pass game and its value
We discuss a subscription game in which service providers (e.g., museums)team up in offering a limited time subscription or access pass allowing unlimited usage of their services. In this game, a natural way to allocate the subscription income among the service providers is by using the Shapley value. We show that, for the particular game considered,the Shapley value takes a very intuitive and computationally simple form.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
|Date of creation:||2003|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (2003) v.43,p.322-325|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
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