A decent proposal
In this paper we explore the notion that players are “decent” in the sense that their choices are bounded by certain unwritten social rules. We apply this idea to problems of Bankruptcy and Implementation. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2004
Volume (Year): 6 (2004)
Issue (Month): 2 (July)
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.springer.com|
Postal:Universidad del País Vasco; DFAE II; Avenida Lehendakari Aguirre, 83; 48015 Bilbao; Spain
Phone: +34 94 6013783
Fax: + 34 94 6013774
Web page: http://spaneconrev.org/
More information through EDIRC
|Order Information:||Web: http://www.springer.com/economics/journal/10108?detailsPage=societies|
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:specre:v:6:y:2004:i:2:p:107-125. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sonal Shukla)or (Rebekah McClure)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.