Implementation with socially responsible agents
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References listed on IDEAS
- Dutta, Bhaskar & Sen, Arunava, 2012.
"Nash implementation with partially honest individuals,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 154-169.
- Dutta, Bhaskar & Sen, Arunava, 2009. "Nash Implementation with Partially Honest Individuals," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 920, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
- Matsushima, Hitoshi, 2008. "Behavioral aspects of implementation theory," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 100(1), pages 161-164, July.
- Uri Gneezy, 2005. "Deception: The Role of Consequences," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(1), pages 384-394, March.
- Michele Lombardi & Naoki Yoshihara, 2017.
"Natural implementation with semi-responsible agents in pure exchange economies,"
International Journal of Game Theory,
Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 46(4), pages 1015-1036, November.
- LOMBARDI, Michele & YOSHIHARA, Naoki, 2016. "Natural implementation with semi-responsible agents in pure exchange economies," Discussion paper series HIAS-E-48, Hitotsubashi Institute for Advanced Study, Hitotsubashi University.
- Michele Lombardi & Naoki Yoshihara, 2017. "Natural implementation with semi-responsible agents in pure exchange economies," UMASS Amherst Economics Working Papers 2017-05, University of Massachusetts Amherst, Department of Economics.
- Michele Lombardi & Naoki Yoshihara, 2017. "Natural implementation with semi-responsible agents in pure exchange economies," Working Papers SDES-2017-11, Kochi University of Technology, School of Economics and Management, revised Aug 2017.
- Eric Maskin, 1999.
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- Eric Maskin, 1998. "Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1829, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
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More about this item
KeywordsSocial responsibility; Nash implementation; Outcome mechanism; Common knowledge;
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
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