Process Manipulation in Unique Implementation
We incorporate social influence into implementation theory, and highlight the manner in which an informed agent feels guilty with regard to disobeying an uninformed principalâ€™s wishes. The degree of this feeling depends on the agentâ€™s expectation of othersâ€™ behavioral modes. We demonstrate a method of process manipulation, through which the principal employs psychological tactics for incentivizing agents to announce information in keeping with his/her wishes. We indicate that with a version of incentive compatibility, the principal can implement any alternative that he/she wishes as the unique Nash equilibrium without employing any contractual devices. Each agentâ€™s psychological cost would be negligible.
|Date of creation:||Dec 2008|
|Date of revision:||Jul 2012|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Hongo 7-3-1, Bunkyo-ku, Tokyo 113-0033|
Web page: http://www.carf.e.u-tokyo.ac.jp/english/
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