Implementation and Social Influence
This paper incorporates social psychology into implementation theory. Real individuals care not only about their material benefits but also about their social influence in terms of obedience and conformity. Using a continuous time horizon, we demonstrate a method of manipulating the decision-making process, according to which, an uninformed principal utilizes her/his power of social influence to incentivize multiple informed agents to make honest announcements. Following this method, we show that with incentive compatibility, the principal can implement any alternative as she/he wishes as the unique Nash equilibrium outcome, even if her/his power is limited and no contractual devices are available.
|Date of creation:||Oct 2008|
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- Matsushima, Hitoshi, 2008.
"Role of honesty in full implementation,"
Journal of Economic Theory,
Elsevier, vol. 139(1), pages 353-359, March.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2006. "Role of Honesty in Full Implementation," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-405, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2007. "Role of Honesty in Full Implementation," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-518, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Matsushima, Hitoshi, 2008. "Behavioral aspects of implementation theory," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 100(1), pages 161-164, July.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2007. "Behavioral Aspects of Implementation Theory," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-523, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Uri Gneezy, 2005. "Deception: The Role of Consequences," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(1), pages 384-394, March.
- Matsushima, Hitoshi, 1988. "A new approach to the implementation problem," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 128-144, June.
- Glazer, Jacob & Rubinstein, Ariel, 1998. "Motives and Implementation: On the Design of Mechanisms to Elicit Opinions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 79(2), pages 157-173, April.
- Martin J. Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 1994. "A Course in Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262650401, July.
- Martin J Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 2009. "A Course in Game Theory," Levine's Bibliography 814577000000000225, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Eric Maskin, 1999. "Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 66(1), pages 23-38.
- Eric Maskin, 1998. "Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1829, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Kfir Eliaz, 2002. "Fault Tolerant Implementation," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 69(3), pages 589-610.
- Abreu Dilip & Matsushima Hitoshi, 1994. "Exact Implementation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 1-19, October.
- Bernheim, B Douglas, 1994. "A Theory of Conformity," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(5), pages 841-877, October.
- Abreu, Dilip & Matsushima, Hitoshi, 1992. "Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies: Complete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(5), pages 993-1008, September. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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