Implementation and Mind Control
This paper incorporates social psychology into implementation theory, where an uninformed principal manipulates a dynamic decision-making process without employing any tailored contractual device. We demonstrate the principal's mind-control method through which he can effectively utilize social psychology tactics to incentivize informed agents to announce their information in keeping with his wishes. We show that with incentive compatibility, the principal can implement any alternative that he wishes as the unique Nash equilibrium outcome, even if the psychological cost of each agent from disobeying the principal's wishes is small as compared to his total material benefits.
|Date of creation:||Sep 2009|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Hongo 7-3-1, Bunkyo-ku, Tokyo 113-0033|
Web page: http://www.carf.e.u-tokyo.ac.jp/english/
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- Matsushima, Hitoshi, 2008.
"Role of honesty in full implementation,"
Journal of Economic Theory,
Elsevier, vol. 139(1), pages 353-359, March.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2006. "Role of Honesty in Full Implementation," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-405, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2007. "Role of Honesty in Full Implementation," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-518, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Matsushima, Hitoshi, 2008. "Behavioral aspects of implementation theory," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 100(1), pages 161-164, July.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2007. "Behavioral Aspects of Implementation Theory," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-523, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Uri Gneezy, 2005. "Deception: The Role of Consequences," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(1), pages 384-394, March.
- Martin J. Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 1994. "A Course in Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262650401, July.
- Martin J Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 2009. "A Course in Game Theory," Levine's Bibliography 814577000000000225, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Bernheim, B Douglas, 1994. "A Theory of Conformity," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(5), pages 841-877, October.
- Abreu, Dilip & Matsushima, Hitoshi, 1992. "Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies: Complete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(5), pages 993-1008, September. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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