Asymmetric parametric division rules
We describe and characterize the family of asymmetric parametric division rules for the adjudication of conflicting claims on a divisible homogeneous good. As part of the characterization, we present two novel axioms which restrict how a division rule indirectly allocates between different versions of the same claimant. We also show that such division rules can alternately be represented as the maximization of an additively separable social welfare function.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- O'Neill, Barry, 1982. "A problem of rights arbitration from the Talmud," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 2(4), pages 345-371, June.
- Thomson, William, 2003. "Axiomatic and game-theoretic analysis of bankruptcy and taxation problems: a survey," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 45(3), pages 249-297, July.
- Ju, Biung-Ghi & Miyagawa, Eiichi & Sakai, Toyotaka, 2007. "Non-manipulable division rules in claim problems and generalizations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 132(1), pages 1-26, January.
- Young, H. P., 1988. "Distributive justice in taxation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 321-335, April.
- MORENO-TERNERO, Juan D. & ROEMER, John E., .
"Impartiality, priority, and solidarity in the theory of justice,"
CORE Discussion Papers RP
1896, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Juan D Moreno-Ternero & John E Roemer, 2006. "Impartiality, Priority, and Solidarity in the Theory of Justice," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 74(5), pages 1419-1427, 09.
- MORENO-TERNERO, Juan D. & ROEMER, John E., 2005. "Impartiality, priority, and solidarity in the theory of justice," CORE Discussion Papers 2005077, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Kaminski, Marek M., 2006. "Parametric rationing methods," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 115-133, January.
- Lensberg, Terje, 1987. "Stability and Collective Rationality," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(4), pages 935-61, July.
- Chambers, Christopher P., 2006. "Asymmetric rules for claims problems without homogeneity," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 241-260, February.
- Naumova, N. I., 2002. "Nonsymmetric equal sacrifice solutions for claim problem," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 1-18, January.
- Hervé Moulin, 2000. "Priority Rules and Other Asymmetric Rationing Methods," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 68(3), pages 643-684, May.
- Toru Hokari & William Thomson, 2003. "Claims problems and weighted generalizations of the Talmud rule," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 21(2), pages 241-261, 03.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:84:y:2014:i:c:p:87-110. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.