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Rationing Rules and Stable Coalition Structures

Listed author(s):
  • Gallo Fernández, Ohiane
  • Iñarra García, Elena
Registered author(s):

    We consider a coalition formation model in which agents have the possibility of forming part of several coalitions but are limited to participate in only one of them. Coalitions of agents produce outputs to be distributed among their members according to their aspirations and to a rationing rule prevailing in society. The outcome of such a process is a hedonic game. Using monotonicity and consistency we characterize the continuous rationing rules that induce core-stable hedonic games.

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    File URL: https://addi.ehu.es/handle/10810/19435
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    Paper provided by Universidad del País Vasco - Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I in its series IKERLANAK with number Ikerlanak;2016-100.

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    Date of creation: 05 Oct 2016
    Handle: RePEc:ehu:ikerla:19435
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    Order Information: Postal: Dpto. de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I, Facultad de CC. Económicas y Empresariales, Universidad del País Vasco, Avda. Lehendakari Aguirre 83, 48015 Bilbao, Spain
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    1. Stovall, John E., 2014. "Asymmetric parametric division rules," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 84(C), pages 87-110.
    2. Karakaya, Mehmet, 2011. "Hedonic coalition formation games: A new stability notion," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 61(3), pages 157-165, May.
    3. Aumann, Robert J. & Maschler, Michael, 1985. "Game theoretic analysis of a bankruptcy problem from the Talmud," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 195-213, August.
    4. Barberà, Salvador & Beviá, Carmen & Ponsatí, Clara, 2015. "Meritocracy, egalitarianism and the stability of majoritarian organizations," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 237-257.
    5. repec:dau:papers:123456789/87 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Hakan İnal, 2015. "Core of coalition formation games and fixed-point methods," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 45(4), pages 745-763, December.
    7. William Thomson, 2008. "Two families of rules for the adjudication of conflicting claims," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 31(4), pages 667-692, December.
    8. Marek Pycia, 2012. "Stability and Preference Alignment in Matching and Coalition Formation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 80(1), pages 323-362, 01.
    9. Bogomolnaia, Anna & Jackson, Matthew O., 2002. "The Stability of Hedonic Coalition Structures," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 38(2), pages 201-230, February.
    10. Tayfun Sönmez & Suryapratim Banerjee & Hideo Konishi, 2001. "Core in a simple coalition formation game," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 18(1), pages 135-153.
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