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Core of coalition formation games and fixed-point methods

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  • Hakan İnal

Abstract

In coalition formation games where agents have preferences over coalitions to which they belong, the set of fixed points of an operator and the core of coalition formation games coincide. An acyclicity condition on preference profiles guarantees the existence of a unique core. An algorithm using that operator finds all core partitions whenever there exists one. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2015

Suggested Citation

  • Hakan İnal, 2015. "Core of coalition formation games and fixed-point methods," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 45(4), pages 745-763, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:45:y:2015:i:4:p:745-763
    DOI: 10.1007/s00355-015-0879-2
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Gallo, Oihane & Inarra, Elena, 2018. "Rationing rules and stable coalition structures," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 13(3), September.
    2. Alcalde-Unzu, Jorge & Gallo, Oihane & Inarra, Elena & Moreno-Ternero, Juan D., 2024. "Solidarity to achieve stability," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 315(1), pages 368-377.
    3. Sheida Etemadidavan & Andrew J. Collins, 2021. "An Empirical Distribution of the Number of Subsets in the Core Partitions of Hedonic Games," SN Operations Research Forum, Springer, vol. 2(4), pages 1-20, December.
    4. Han, Lining & Juarez, Ruben & Vargas, Miguel, 2023. "Robust equilibria in tournaments," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 142(C), pages 423-439.
    5. Bonifacio, A.G. & Inarra, E. & Neme, P., 2024. "A characterization of absorbing sets in coalition formation games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 148(C), pages 1-22.
    6. Satoshi Nakada & Ryo Shirakawa, 2023. "On the unique core partition of coalition formation games: correction to İnal (2015)," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 60(3), pages 517-521, April.
    7. Gallo Fernández, Oihane & Iñarra García, María Elena, 2016. "Rationing Rules and Stable Coalition Structures," IKERLANAK 19435, Universidad del País Vasco - Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I.
    8. Bo Chen, 2019. "Downstream competition and upstream labor market matching," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 48(4), pages 1055-1085, December.
    9. Bonifacio, A.G. & Inarra, E. & Neme, P., 2024. "A characterization of absorbing sets in coalition formation games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 148(C), pages 1-22.
    10. Agustín G. Bonifacio & Elena Inarra & Pablo Neme, 2022. "Stable Decompositions of Coalition Formation Games," Working Papers 110, Red Nacional de Investigadores en Economía (RedNIE).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    C78; C71;

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games

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