Updating Claims in Bankruptcy Problems
We reexamine the consistency axiom in bankruptcy problems and propose arguments in favor of an alternative definition of a reduced problem. The classical definition updates the size of the estate while keeping agents' claims unaffected. Instead, we suggest updating agents' claims along with the estate. The resulting consistency axiom characterizes the well-known Random Arrival rule as the unique bilaterally consistent extension of the Contested Garment rule to many agents. We also establish that our definition of a reduced bankruptcy problem corresponds to the definition of a reduced TU game proposed in Hart & Mas-Colell (Econometrica, 1989).
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- Thomson, W., 1996. "Consistent Allocation Rules," RCER Working Papers 418, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
- Hart, Sergiu & Mas-Colell, Andreu, 1989. "Potential, Value, and Consistency," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(3), pages 589-614, May.
- Sudholter, Peter, 1998. "Axiomatizations of Game Theoretical Solutions for One-Output Cost Sharing Problems," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 24(1-2), pages 142-171, July.
- Aumann, Robert J. & Maschler, Michael, 1985. "Game theoretic analysis of a bankruptcy problem from the Talmud," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 195-213, August.
- Thomson, William, 2003. "Axiomatic and game-theoretic analysis of bankruptcy and taxation problems: a survey," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 45(3), pages 249-297, July.
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