IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Log in (now much improved!) to save this paper

Updating Claims in Bankruptcy Problems

Author Info

Listed author(s):

Abstract

We reexamine the consistency axiom in bankruptcy problems and propose arguments in favor of an alternative definition of a reduced problem. The classical definition updates the size of the estate while keeping agents' claims unaffected. Instead, we suggest updating agents' claims along with the estate. The resulting consistency axiom characterizes the well-known Random Arrival rule as the unique bilaterally consistent extension of the Contested Garment rule to many agents. We also establish that our definition of a reduced bankruptcy problem corresponds to the definition of a reduced TU game proposed in Hart & Mas-Colell (Econometrica, 1989).

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.hec.ca/iea/cahiers/2008/iea0808_jleroux.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by HEC Montréal, Institut d'économie appliquée in its series Cahiers de recherche with number 08-08.

as
in new window

Length: 14 pages
Date of creation: Aug 2008
Handle: RePEc:iea:carech:0808
Contact details of provider: Postal:
Institut d'économie appliquée HEC Montréal 3000, Chemin de la Côte-Sainte-Catherine Montréal, Québec H3T 2A7

Phone: (514) 340-6463
Fax: (514) 340-6469
Web page: http://www.hec.ca/iea/
Email:


More information through EDIRC

Order Information: Postal: Institut d'économie appliquée HEC Montréal 3000, Chemin de la Côte-Sainte-Catherine Montréal, Québec H3T 2A7
Email:


Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
  • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as
in new window


  1. Sudholter, Peter, 1998. "Axiomatizations of Game Theoretical Solutions for One-Output Cost Sharing Problems," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 24(1-2), pages 142-171, July.
  2. Thomson, William, 2003. "Axiomatic and game-theoretic analysis of bankruptcy and taxation problems: a survey," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 45(3), pages 249-297, July.
  3. Thomson, W., 1996. "Consistent Allocation Rules," RCER Working Papers 418, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
  4. Aumann, Robert J. & Maschler, Michael, 1985. "Game theoretic analysis of a bankruptcy problem from the Talmud," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 195-213, August.
  5. Hart, Sergiu & Mas-Colell, Andreu, 1989. "Potential, Value, and Consistency," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(3), pages 589-614, May.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.

as
in new window


Cited by:

  1. Yan-an Hwang & Tsung-fu Wang, 2009. "Population monotonicity, consistency and the random arrival rule," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 29(4), pages 2816-2821.
  2. Thomson, William, 2015. "Axiomatic and game-theoretic analysis of bankruptcy and taxation problems: An update," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 74(C), pages 41-59.

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Access and download statistics

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:iea:carech:0808. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Patricia Power)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.