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Rationing problems with payoff thresholds

  • Pere Timoner


    (Facultat d'Economia i Empresa; Universitat de Barcelona (UB))

  • Josep Maria Izquierdo


    (Facultat d'Economia i Empresa; Universitat de Barcelona (UB))

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    An extension of the standard rationing model is introduced. Agents are not only identi fied by their respective claims over some amount of a scarce resource, but also by some payoff thresholds. These thresholds introduce exogenous differences among agents (full or partial priority, past allocations, past debts, ...) that may influence the final distribution. Within this framework we provide generalizations of the constrained equal awards rule and the constrained equal losses rule. We show that these generalized rules are dual from each other.We characterize the generalization of the equal awards rule by using the properties of consistency, path-independence and compensated exemption. Finally,we use the duality between rules to characterize the generalization of the equal losses solution.

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    Paper provided by Universitat de Barcelona, Facultat d'Economia i Empresa, UB Economics in its series UB Economics Working Papers with number 2014/311.

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    Length: 28 pages
    Date of creation: 2014
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:ewp:wpaper:311web
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    1. Kaminski, Marek M., 2000. "'Hydraulic' rationing," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 40(2), pages 131-155, September.
    2. HOUGAARD, Jens Leth & MORENO-TERNERO, Juan D. & OSTERDAL, Lars Peter, . "A unifying framework for the problem of adjudicating conflicting claims," CORE Discussion Papers RP 2399, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    3. Pulido, M. & Borm, P.E.M. & Hendrickx, R.L.P. & Llorca, N. & Sánchez-Soriano, J., 2008. "Compromise solutions for bankruptcy situations with references," Other publications TiSEM d5052c4d-eda1-4d7e-b3d0-d, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    4. Herrero, Carmen & Villar, Antonio, 2001. "The three musketeers: four classical solutions to bankruptcy problems," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 42(3), pages 307-328, November.
    5. Hervé Moulin, 2000. "Priority Rules and Other Asymmetric Rationing Methods," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 68(3), pages 643-684, May.
    6. Thomson, William, 2003. "Axiomatic and game-theoretic analysis of bankruptcy and taxation problems: a survey," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 45(3), pages 249-297, July.
    7. Jens Leth Hougaard & Juan D. Moreno-Ternero & Lars Peter Østerdal, 2012. "Rationing with Baselines: The Composition Extension Operator," MSAP Working Paper Series 08_2012, University of Copenhagen, Department of Food and Resource Economics.
    8. Hougaard, Jens Leth & Moreno-Ternero, Juan D. & Østerdal, Lars Peter, 2012. "Rationing in the presence of baselines," Discussion Papers of Business and Economics 8/2012, Department of Business and Economics, University of Southern Denmark.
    9. Aumann, Robert J. & Maschler, Michael, 1985. "Game theoretic analysis of a bankruptcy problem from the Talmud," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 195-213, August.
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