Coalitional manipulations in a bankruptcy problem
In a bankruptcy problem framework we consider rules immune to possible manipulations by the creditors involved in the problem via merging or splitting of their individual claims. The paper provides characterization theorems for the non manipulable rules, the no advantageous merging parametric rules and the no advantageous splitting parametric rules.
Volume (Year): 4 (1999)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
|Note:||Received: 24 February 1998 / accepted: 9 March 1999|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.springer.com|
|Order Information:||Web: http://www.springer.com/economics/journal/10058|
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