Extensive Form Games with Coalitional Actions
I introduce a model of extensive form games with coalitional actions, which provides a formal framework for analysing situations in which coalitions of players may take joint actions sequentially. I present an equilibrium concept that generalizes subgame-perfect equilibrium, and is closely related to the core. The new theory provides insights into the theory of sequential economies.
|Date of creation:||Dec 1995|
|Date of revision:||Jan 1999|
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