The Nash Bargaining Solution and Interpersonal Utility Comparisons
Bargaining theory has a conceptual dichotomy at its core: according to one view, the utilities in the bargaining problem are meaningless numbers (v-N.M utilities), while according to another view they do have concrete meaning (willingness to pay). The former position is assumed by the Nash and Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions, and the latter is assumed by the egalitarian, utilitarian, and equal-loss solutions. In this paper I describe a certain form of equivalence between the set consisting of the former solutions and the set consisting of the latter. This equivalence is the result of an attempt to bridge the gap between the aforementioned views; utilizing this equivalence, I derive a new axiomatization of the Nash solution.
|Date of creation:||06 Feb 2012|
|Date of revision:||06 Feb 2012|
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- Geoffroy de Clippel, 2004.
"An Axiomatization of the Nash Bargaining Solution,"
2004-17, Brown University, Department of Economics.
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