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Target-based solutions for Nash bargaining

Listed author(s):
  • Lorenzo Bastianello

    ()

    (EDE-EM, Universite Paris 1-Pantheon-Sorbonne)

  • Marco LiCalzi

    ()

    (Dept. of Management, Università Ca' Foscari Venice)

We revisit the Nash model for two-person bargaining. A mediator knows agents' ordinal preferences over feasible proposals, but has incomplete information about their acceptance thresholds. We provide a behavioural characterisation under which the mediator recommends a proposal that maximises the probability that bargainers strike an agreement. Some major solutions are recovered as special cases; in particular, we offer a straightforward interpretation for the product operator underlying the Nash solution.

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File URL: http://virgo.unive.it/wpideas/storage/2015wp05.pdf
File Function: First version, 2015
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by Department of Management, Università Ca' Foscari Venezia in its series Working Papers with number 5.

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Length: 26 pages
Date of creation: Jun 2015
Handle: RePEc:vnm:wpdman:106
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  1. Robert Bordley & Marco LiCalzi, 2000. "Decision analysis using targets instead of utility functions," Decisions in Economics and Finance, Springer;Associazione per la Matematica, vol. 23(1), pages 53-74.
  2. Marco LiCalzi, 2005. "A language for the construction of preferences under uncertainty," Game Theory and Information 0509002, EconWPA.
  3. Nikolay Nenovsky & S. Statev, 2006. "Introduction," Post-Print halshs-00260898, HAL.
  4. Trockel, W., 2008. "The Nash product is a utility representation of the Pareto ordering," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 99(2), pages 220-222, May.
  5. Erio Castagnoli & Marco LiCalzi, 2005. "Expected utility without utility," Game Theory and Information 0508004, EconWPA.
  6. John C. Harsanyi & Reinhard Selten, 1972. "A Generalized Nash Solution for Two-Person Bargaining Games with Incomplete Information," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 18(5-Part-2), pages 80-106, January.
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