Target-based solutions for Nash bargaining
We revisit the Nash model for two-person bargaining. A mediator knows agents' ordinal preferences over feasible proposals, but has incomplete information about their acceptance thresholds. We provide a behavioural characterisation under which the mediator recommends a proposal that maximises the probability that bargainers strike an agreement. Some major solutions are recovered as special cases; in particular, we offer a straightforward interpretation for the product operator underlying the Nash solution.
|Date of creation:||Jun 2015|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: San Giobbe, Cannaregio 873, 30121 Venezia|
Phone: +39 0412348721
Fax: +39 0412348701
Web page: http://www.unive.it/dip.management
More information through EDIRC
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Robert Bordley & Marco LiCalzi, 2000. "Decision analysis using targets instead of utility functions," Decisions in Economics and Finance, Springer;Associazione per la Matematica, vol. 23(1), pages 53-74.
- Marco LiCalzi, 2005. "A language for the construction of preferences under uncertainty," Game Theory and Information 0509002, EconWPA.
- Nikolay Nenovsky & S. Statev, 2006. "Introduction," Post-Print halshs-00260898, HAL.
- Trockel, W., 2008. "The Nash product is a utility representation of the Pareto ordering," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 99(2), pages 220-222, May.
- Erio Castagnoli & Marco LiCalzi, 2005. "Expected utility without utility," Game Theory and Information 0508004, EconWPA.
- John C. Harsanyi & Reinhard Selten, 1972. "A Generalized Nash Solution for Two-Person Bargaining Games with Incomplete Information," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 18(5-Part-2), pages 80-106, January.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:vnm:wpdman:106. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Marco LiCalzi)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.