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Preferences over Solutions to the Bargaining Problem

Author

Listed:
  • Kim C. Border
  • Uzi Segal

Abstract

There are several solutions to the Nash bargaining problem in the literature. Since various authors have expressed preferences for one solution over another, the authors find it useful to study preferences over solutions in their own right. They identify a set of appealing axioms on such preferences that lead to unanimity in the choice of solution, which turns out to be the solution of Nash. The key axiom is mixture symmetry, implying that if two solutions are equally attractive, then the half-half mixture of them is (weakly) preferred to any other mixture of the two.

Suggested Citation

  • Kim C. Border & Uzi Segal, 1997. "Preferences over Solutions to the Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 65(1), pages 1-18, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:65:y:1997:i:1:p:1-18
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    Cited by:

    1. Vartiainen, Hannu, 2007. "Collective choice with endogenous reference outcome," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 58(1), pages 172-180, January.
    2. Uzi Segal, 2000. "Let's Agree That All Dictatorships Are Equally Bad," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 108(3), pages 569-589, June.
    3. Walter Trockel, 1999. "Integrating the Nash Program into Mechanism Theory," UCLA Economics Working Papers 787, UCLA Department of Economics.
    4. Haskel, Jonathan & Sanchis, Amparo, 2000. "A bargaining model of Farrell inefficiency," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 18(4), pages 539-556, May.
    5. Vincent Martinet & Pedro Gajardo & Michel De Lara & Héctor Ramírez Cabrera, 2011. "Bargaining with intertemporal maximin payoffs," EconomiX Working Papers 2011-7, University of Paris Nanterre, EconomiX.
    6. Naeve-Steinweg, E., 2004. "The averaging mechanism," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 46(2), pages 410-424, February.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • C79 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Other

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