Preferences Over Solutions to the Margaining Probem
There are several solutions to the Nash bargaining problem in the literature. Since various authors have expressed preferences for one solution over another, the authors find it useful to study preferences over solutions in their own right. They identify a set of appealing axioms on such preferences that lead to unanimity in the choice of solution, which turns out to be the solution of Nash. The key axiom is mixture symmetry, implying that if two solutions are equally attractive, then the half-half mixture of them is (weakly) preferred to any other mixture of the two.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
|Date of creation:||1995|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Phone: 519-661-2111 Ext.85244
Web page: http://economics.uwo.ca/research/research_papers/department_working_papers.html
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:uwo:uwowop:9518. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.