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College Admissions And The Role Of Information: An Experimental Study

Author

Listed:
  • Joana Pais
  • Ágnes Pintér
  • Róbert F. Veszteg

Abstract

We analyze two well-known matching mechanisms--the Gale-Shapley, and the Top Trading Cycles (TTC) mechanisms--in theexperimental lab in three different informational settings, and study the role of information in individual decision making. Our results suggest that--in line with the theory--in the college admissions model the Gale-Shapley mechanism outperforms the TTC mechanisms in terms of efficiency and stability, and it is as successful as the TTC mechanism regarding the proportion of truthful preference revelation. In addition, we find that information has an important effect on truthful behavior and stability. Nevertheless, regarding efficiency, the Gale-Shapley mechanism is less sensitive to the amount of information participants hold.
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Suggested Citation

  • Joana Pais & Ágnes Pintér & Róbert F. Veszteg, 2011. "College Admissions And The Role Of Information: An Experimental Study," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 52(3), pages 713-737, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:ier:iecrev:v:52:y:2011:i:3:p:713-737
    DOI: j.1468-2354.2011.00647.x
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/j.1468-2354.2011.00647.x
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Ran I. Shorrer & Sandor Sovago, 2017. "Obvious Mistakes in a Strategically Simple College Admissions Environment," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 17-107/V, Tinbergen Institute.
    2. Pablo Guillen & Rustamdjan Hakimov, 2017. "Not quite the best response: truth-telling, strategy-proof matching, and the manipulation of others," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 20(3), pages 670-686, September.
    3. Zuchanek, Kevin J., 2025. "Bridging language gaps: Native language school assignment information under immediate acceptance," Ruhr Economic Papers 1172, RWI - Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-University Bochum, TU Dortmund University, University of Duisburg-Essen.
    4. Pablo Guillen & Róbert F. Veszteg, 2021. "Strategy-proofness in experimental matching markets," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 24(2), pages 650-668, June.
    5. Yan Chen & Yingzhi Liang & Tayfun Sönmez, 2016. "School choice under complete information: An experimental study," The Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design, Society for the Promotion of Mechanism and Institution Design, University of York, vol. 1(1), pages 45-82, December.
    6. Chen, Yan & He, YingHua, 2021. "Information acquisition and provision in school choice: An experimental study," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 197(C).
    7. Braun, Sebastian & Dwenger, Nadja & Kübler, Dorothea & Westkamp, Alexander, 2012. "Implementing quotas in university admissions: An experimental investigation," Kiel Working Papers 1761, Kiel Institute for the World Economy.
    8. Guillen, Pablo & Hakimov, Rustamdjan, 2018. "The effectiveness of top-down advice in strategy-proof mechanisms: A field experiment," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 101(C), pages 505-511.
    9. Guillen, Pablo & Hing, Alexander, 2014. "Lying through their teeth: Third party advice and truth telling in a strategy proof mechanism," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 70(C), pages 178-185.
    10. Hakimov, Rustamdjan & Kübler, Dorothea, 2021. "Experiments on centralized school choice and college admissions: a survey," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 24(2), pages 434-488.
    11. Yoan Hermstrüwer, 2019. "Transparency and Fairness in School Choice Mechanisms," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Behavioral Economics 2019_11, Max Planck Institute for Behavioral Economics.
    12. Braun, Sebastian & Dwenger, Nadja & Kübler, Dorothea & Westkamp, Alexander, 2014. "Implementing quotas in university admissions: An experimental analysis," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 85(C), pages 232-251.
    13. Gudmundsson , Jens, 2014. "Sequences in Pairing Problems: A New Approach to Reconcile Stability with Strategy-Proofness for Elementary Matching Problems," Working Papers 2014:40, Lund University, Department of Economics.
    14. Hu, Xinquan & Yao, Lan, 2024. "Cognitive ability in matching with strategic uncertainty: An experimental study," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 88(C).
    15. Christer Andersson & Ola Andersson & Tommy Andersson, 2013. "Sealed bid auctions versus ascending bid auctions: an experimental study," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 17(1), pages 1-16, March.
    16. Müge Süer & Michel Tolksdorf & Vincent Meisner & Sokol Tominaj, 2025. "Confidence and Information in Strategy-Proof School Choice," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 546, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
    17. Avinatan Hassidim & Assaf Romm & Ran I. Shorrer, 2021. "The Limits of Incentives in Economic Matching Procedures," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 67(2), pages 951-963, February.
    18. Hakimov, Rustamdjan & Kübler, Dorothea, 2019. "Experiments On Matching Markets: A Survey," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 153, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
    19. Christian Basteck & Marco Mantovani, 2023. "Aiding applicants: leveling the playing field within the immediate acceptance mechanism," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 27(1), pages 187-220, February.
    20. Guillen, Pablo & Hakimov, Rustamdjan, 2014. "Monkey see, monkey do: Truth-telling in matching algorithms and the manipulation of others," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Behavior SP II 2014-202, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
    21. Juan D. Carrillo & Saurabh Singhal, 2016. "Tiered Housing Allocation with Preannounced Rankings: An Experimental Analysis," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 25(1), pages 133-160, March.
    22. Guillén, Pablo & Hakimov, Rustamdjan, 2015. "How to get truthful reporting in matching markets: A field experiment," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Behavior SP II 2015-208, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
    23. Afacan, Mustafa Oğuz & Evdokimov, Piotr & Hakimov, Rustamdjan & Turhan, Bertan, 2022. "Parallel markets in school choice," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 133(C), pages 181-201.
    24. repec:syd:wpaper:2123/9951 is not listed on IDEAS
    25. Kawaguchi, Riho & Yanagisawa, Daichi & Nishinari, Katsuhiro, 2019. "Decision-making with reference information," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 519(C), pages 109-118.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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