Matching And Efficiency In The Baseball Free-Agent System: An Experimental Examination
This article presents the results of an experimental study investigating the problem of allocating heterogeneous indivisible objects using market-like mechanisms. The object of study is the market for professional baseball players in their free-agent year. The authors investigate both the current free-agency system and a variant of the current system instituted informally by the teams and ruled illegal by arbitrators. They then propose and test a new alternative matching mechanism, which proves to have quite a few desirable characteristics. Copyright 1995 by University of Chicago Press.
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