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Protective Behaviour in Matching Models

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  • Barbera, S.
  • Dutta, B.

Abstract

This paper analyzes the use of a version of lexical maximim strategies, called protective behavior, in two-sided matching models. It restricts attention to mechanisms which produce stable matchings, that is, matchings which are individually rational and pairwise optimal. The main results of the paper show that truth-telling is the unique form of protective behavior in two such mechanisms. The first is the one which selects the student-optimal stable matching in the college-admissions model, while the second is the mechanism which selects the buyer-optimal matching in the Shapley-Shubik assignment model. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C78, D81.
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Suggested Citation

  • Barbera, S. & Dutta, B., 1991. "Protective Behaviour in Matching Models," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 157.91, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
    • Handle: RePEc:aub:autbar:157.91
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Barbara, Salvador & Jackson, Matthew, 1988. "Maximin, leximin, and the protective criterion: Characterizations and comparisons," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 34-44, October.
    2. Barbera, Salvador & Dutta, Bhaskar, 1982. "Implementability via protective equilibria," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 49-65, June.
    3. Roth, Alvin E., 1985. "The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 277-288, August.
    4. Barbera, Salvador & Pattanaik, Prasanta K., 1984. "Extending an order on a Set to the power set: Some remarks on Kannai and Peleg's approach," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 32(1), pages 185-191, February.
    5. Roth, Alvin E., 1984. "Misrepresentation and stability in the marriage problem," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 34(2), pages 383-387, December.
    6. Kannai, Yakar & Peleg, Bezalel, 1984. "A note on the extension of an order on a set to the power set," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 32(1), pages 172-175, February.
    7. Roth, Alvin E., 1989. "Two-sided matching with incomplete information about others' preferences," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 1(2), pages 191-209, June.
    8. Leonard, Herman B, 1983. "Elicitation of Honest Preferences for the Assignment of Individuals to Positions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(3), pages 461-479, June.
    9. Moulin, Herve, 1981. "Prudence versus sophistication in voting strategy," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 24(3), pages 398-412, June.
    10. Partha Dasgupta & Peter Hammond & Eric Maskin, 1979. "The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 46(2), pages 185-216.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Pais, Joana & Pintér, Ágnes, 2008. "School choice and information: An experimental study on matching mechanisms," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 303-328, September.
    2. Marco Castillo & Ahrash Dianat, 2021. "Strategic uncertainty and equilibrium selection in stable matching mechanisms: experimental evidence," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 24(4), pages 1365-1389, December.
    3. Fiestras-Janeiro, G. & Borm, P.E.M. & van Megen, F.J.C., 1996. "Protective Behavior in Games," Other publications TiSEM 0f0d5aed-021d-45d8-9776-0, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    4. Joana Pais & Ágnes Pintér & Róbert F. Veszteg, 2011. "College Admissions And The Role Of Information: An Experimental Study," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 52(3), pages 713-737, August.
    5. Guillemette de Larquier, 1997. "Principes des marchés régis par appariement," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 48(6), pages 1409-1438.
    6. Nicoló, Antonio & Rodríguez-Álvarez, Carmelo, 2012. "Transplant quality and patientsʼ preferences in paired kidney exchange," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 299-310.
    7. Flip Klijn & Joana Pais & Marc Vorsatz, 2013. "Preference intensities and risk aversion in school choice: a laboratory experiment," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 16(1), pages 1-22, March.
    8. Troyan, Peter & Morrill, Thayer, 2020. "Obvious manipulations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 185(C).
    9. Naeve, Jorg, 2000. "Maximax, leximax, and the demanding criterion," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 40(3), pages 313-325, November.
    10. Fonseca-Mairena, María Haydée & Triossi, Matteo, 2022. "Incentives and implementation in allocation problems with externalities," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 99(C).
    11. Featherstone, Clayton R. & Niederle, Muriel, 2016. "Boston versus deferred acceptance in an interim setting: An experimental investigation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 100(C), pages 353-375.
    12. Fiestras-Janeiro, Gloria & Borm, Peter & van Megen, Freek, 1998. "Protective and Prudent Behaviour in Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 78(1), pages 167-175, January.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    game theory ; market ; microeconomics ; economic equilibrium;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty

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