Maximax, leximax, and the demanding criterion
No abstract is available for this item.
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Fiestras-Janeiro, G. & Borm, P.E.M. & van Megen, F.J.C., 1998. "Protective behavior in games," Other publications TiSEM 92723c0f-5357-4985-9733-c, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Kelsey, D., 1991.
"Choice Under Partial Uncertainty,"
91-19, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham.
- Barbera, Salvador & Dutta, Bhaskar, 1982. "Implementability via protective equilibria," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 49-65, June.
- Barbara, Salvador & Jackson, Matthew, 1988. "Maximin, leximin, and the protective criterion: Characterizations and comparisons," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 34-44, October.
- Barberà, S. & Dutta, B., 1995.
"Protective behavior in matching models,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 8(2), pages 281-296.
- Fiestras-Janeiro, Gloria & Borm, Peter & van Megen, Freek, 1998. "Protective and Prudent Behaviour in Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 78(1), pages 167-175, January.
- Moulin, Herve, 1981.
"Prudence versus sophistication in voting strategy,"
Journal of Economic Theory,
Elsevier, vol. 24(3), pages 398-412, June.
- Barbera, Salvador & Dutta, Bhaskar, 1986. "General, direct and self-implementation of social choice functions via protective equilibria," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 11(2), pages 109-127, April.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:40:y:2000:i:3:p:313-325. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.