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Prudence versus sophistication in voting strategy

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  • Moulin, Herve

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  • Moulin, Herve, 1981. "Prudence versus sophistication in voting strategy," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 24(3), pages 398-412, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:24:y:1981:i:3:p:398-412
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    Cited by:

    1. Laslier, Jean-François & Núñez, Matías & Remzi Sanver, M., 2021. "A solution to the two-person implementation problem," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 194(C).
    2. Bogomolnaia, Anna & Holzman, Ron & Moulin, Hervé, 2023. "On guarantees, vetoes and random dictators," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 18(1), January.
    3. Anna bogomolnaia Ron Holzman Herve Moulin, 2021. "Wost Case in Voting and Bargaining," Papers 2104.02316, arXiv.org.
    4. Fiestras-Janeiro, G. & Borm, P.E.M. & van Megen, F.J.C., 1996. "Protective Behavior in Games," Other publications TiSEM 0f0d5aed-021d-45d8-9776-0, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    5. Anna Bogomolnaia & Ron Holzman & Hervé Moulin, 2021. "Worst Case in Voting and Bargaining," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-03196999, HAL.
    6. Naeve, Jorg, 2000. "Maximax, leximax, and the demanding criterion," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 40(3), pages 313-325, November.
    7. Yasunori Okumura, 2021. "Rank-dominant strategy and sincere voting," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 90(1), pages 117-145, February.
    8. Salvador Barberà & Danilo Coelho, 2022. "Compromising on compromise rules," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 53(1), pages 95-112, March.
    9. Cardona-Coll, Daniel, 1997. "Voting by veto and the role of the compromise function," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 33(2), pages 101-113, April.
    10. Van der Linden, Martin, 2017. "Impossibilities for strategy-proof committee selection mechanisms with vetoers," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 73(C), pages 111-121.
    11. Le Breton, Michel, 2016. "The Condorcet Principle Implies the Proxy Voting Paradox," IAST Working Papers 16-80, Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse (IAST).
    12. Barberà, S. & Dutta, B., 1995. "Protective behavior in matching models," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 8(2), pages 281-296.
    13. Andjiga, Nicolas Gabriel & Mbih, Boniface & Moyouwou, Issofa, 2008. "Manipulation of voting schemes with restricted beliefs," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(11), pages 1232-1242, December.
    14. Sauermann, Jan & Beckmann, Paul, 2019. "The influence of group size on distributional fairness under voting by veto," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 56(C), pages 90-102.
    15. Fiestras-Janeiro, Gloria & Borm, Peter & van Megen, Freek, 1998. "Protective and Prudent Behaviour in Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 78(1), pages 167-175, January.
    16. Novikova, Natalia M. & Pospelova, Irina I., 2017. "A lemma in open sequential voting by veto," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 141-144.
    17. Dan S. Felsenthal, 2017. "Comment on “Proposals for a Democracy of the Future” by Bruno Frey," Homo Oeconomicus: Journal of Behavioral and Institutional Economics, Springer, vol. 34(2), pages 195-200, November.
    18. Dennis Mueller, 1999. "Fundamental Issues in Constitutional Reform: With Special Reference to Latin America and the United States," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 10(2), pages 119-148, June.
    19. Le Breton, Michel, 2016. "The Condorcet Principle Implies the Proxy Voting Paradox," TSE Working Papers 16-619, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
    20. Matt Essen & John Wooders, 2020. "Dissolving a partnership securely," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 69(2), pages 415-434, March.
    21. Fany Yuval, 2002. "Sophisticated Voting Under the Sequential Voting by Veto 1," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 53(4), pages 343-369, December.

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