Sophisticated Voting Under the Sequential Voting by Veto 1
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References listed on IDEAS
- Plott, Charles R & Levine, Michael E, 1978.
"A Model of Agenda Influence on Committee Decisions,"
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Van der Linden, Martin, 2017.
"Impossibilities for strategy-proof committee selection mechanisms with vetoers,"
Journal of Mathematical Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 73(C), pages 111-121.
- Martin Van der linden, 2016. "Impossibilities for strategy-proof committee selection mechanisms with vetoes," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 16-00018, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
- Hortala-Vallve, Rafael & Llorente-Saguer, Aniol, 2010. "A simple mechanism for resolving conflict," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 375-391, November.
- repec:eee:poleco:v:56:y:2019:i:c:p:90-102 is not listed on IDEAS
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More about this item
KeywordsMinority principle; Strategic voting; Veto; Voters' behavior;
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