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Toward an informational dynamics of collective choice

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  • Pam Brown

Abstract

In the following argument, it is suggested that the informational dimension of small-scale collective choice systems be introduced into the set of explanatory variables, be allowed to fluctuate while the ‘committee’ is in session and, finally, be permitted to “feed back” to the individual participants during the group decision process. It is suggested that consideration of the in-period or ‘in-committee’ shocks which this release and flow of information may be modeled to have on the participants’ round-to-round voting strategies might provide a supplementary explanation of some of the anomalous results (such as the relative rarity of observed cycling) encountered in observations of collectively controlled systems. Copyright Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1982

Suggested Citation

  • Pam Brown, 1982. "Toward an informational dynamics of collective choice," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 39(3), pages 415-420, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:39:y:1982:i:3:p:415-420
    DOI: 10.1007/BF00118797
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Plott, Charles R & Levine, Michael E, 1978. "A Model of Agenda Influence on Committee Decisions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 68(1), pages 146-160, March.
    2. Anthony Downs, 1957. "An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 65(2), pages 135-135.
    3. Grether, David M & Plott, Charles R, 1979. "Economic Theory of Choice and the Preference Reversal Phenomenon," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 69(4), pages 623-638, September.
    4. McKelvey, Richard D. & Niemi, Richard G., 1978. "A multistage game representation of sophisticated voting for binary procedures," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 1-22, June.
    5. Gordon Tullock, 1964. "The Irrationality Of Intransitivity," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 16(3), pages 401-406.
    6. Gordon Tullock, 1959. "Problems of Majority Voting," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 67(6), pages 571-571.
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