IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/oml/wpaper/202006.html

Communication via Third Parties

Author

Listed:
  • Jacopo Bizzotto

    (Oslo Business School - OsloMet)

  • Eduardo Perez-Richet

    (Sciences Po)

  • Adrien Vigier

    (University of Oxford - Department of Economics)

Abstract

We consider a general information design problem in which the task of running a procedure generating information for a continuation game is performed by an agent. A moral hazard roblem therefore emerges in which the principal faces a trade-off between generating information with an eye to the continuation game, and incentivizing the agent to comply with the procedure designed. We provide a methodology to tackle such problems, and examine the way in which moral hazard affects the optimal procedure of the principal.

Suggested Citation

  • Jacopo Bizzotto & Eduardo Perez-Richet & Adrien Vigier, 2020. "Communication via Third Parties," Working Papers 202006, Oslo Metropolitan University, Oslo Business School.
    • Handle: RePEc:oml:wpaper:202006
    DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3530804
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3530804
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.2139/ssrn.3530804?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Gerardi, Dino & Grillo, Edoardo & Monzón, Ignacio, 2022. "The perils of friendly oversight," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 204(C).
    3. Jacopo Bizzotto & Adrien Vigier, 2022. "A Case for Tiered School Systems," Working Papers 202205, Oslo Metropolitan University, Oslo Business School.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:oml:wpaper:202006. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Eirik Hanssen (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/ohioano.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.