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Report NEP-DES-2019-05-20
This is the archive for NEP-DES, a report on new working papers in the area of Economic Design. Alexander Teytelboym issued this report. It is usually issued weekly.Subscribe to this report: email, RSS, or Mastodon, or Bluesky.
Other reports in NEP-DES
The following items were announced in this report:
- Alexander L. Brown & Rodrigo A. Velez, 2019, "Empirical bias and efficiency of alpha-auctions: experimental evidence," Papers, arXiv.org, number 1905.03876, May, revised Jul 2020.
- Carlos Segura-Rodriguez, 2019, "Selling Data," PIER Working Paper Archive, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, number 19-006, Apr.
- Item repec:spo:wpmain:info:hdl:2441/31aa5v8jtp9p48jlhrq44psjoa is not listed on IDEAS anymore
- Pierre Dehez & Victor Ginsburgh, 2019, "Approval voting and Shapley ranking," Working Papers of BETA, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg, number 2019-17.
- Nicolas Jacquemet & Alexander James & Stéphane Luchini & Jason Shogren, 2017, "Referenda Under Oath," Post-Print, HAL, number halshs-01301784, Jul, DOI: 10.1007/s10640-016-0023-5.
- Norde, Henk & Voorneveld, Mark, 2019, "Feasible best-response correspondences and quadratic scoring rules," SSE Working Paper Series in Economics, Stockholm School of Economics, number 2019:2, Apr.