A note on the tight simplification of mechanisms
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References listed on IDEAS
- Milgrom, Paul, 2010.
"Simplified mechanisms with an application to sponsored-search auctions,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 70(1), pages 62-70, September.
- Paul Milgrom, 2008. "Simplified Mechanisms with an Application to Sponsored-Search Auctions," Discussion Papers 08-013, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Matías Núñez & Jean Laslier, 2014.
"Preference intensity representation: strategic overstating in large elections,"
Social Choice and Welfare,
Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 42(2), pages 313-340, February.
- Matias Nunez & Jean-François Laslier, 2013. "Preference Intensity Representation : Strategic Overstating in Large Elections," Post-Print hal-00917099, HAL.
More about this item
KeywordsMechanism design Simplification Tightness;
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
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