A note on the tight simplification of mechanisms
This note offers characterizations of tightness and weak tightness. It shows that when the preference domain is that of continuous utility functions on the outcome space, the two notions are equivalent to the outcome closure property of Milgrom (2010a).
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- Milgrom, Paul, 2010.
"Simplified mechanisms with an application to sponsored-search auctions,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 70(1), pages 62-70, September.
- Paul Milgrom, 2008. "Simplified Mechanisms with an Application to Sponsored-Search Auctions," Discussion Papers 08-013, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.