InfoBid: A Simulation Framework for Studying Information Disclosure in Auctions with Large Language Model-based Agents
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This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-AIN-2025-05-05 (Artificial Intelligence)
- NEP-CMP-2025-05-05 (Computational Economics)
- NEP-DES-2025-05-05 (Economic Design)
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