Simplified mechanisms with an application to sponsored-search auctions
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- Paul Milgrom, 2008. "Simplified Mechanisms with an Application to Sponsored-Search Auctions," Discussion Papers 08-013, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.
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More about this item
KeywordsSponsored search Generalized second-price auctions Mechanism design;
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
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