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Unawareness and selective disclosure: The effect of school quality information on property prices

Author

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  • Haisken-DeNew, John
  • Hasan, Syed
  • Jha, Nikhil
  • Sinning, Mathias

Abstract

The Australian Government launched the My School website in 2010 to provide standardised information about the quality of schools to the Australian public. This paper combines data from this website with home sales data for the state of Victoria to estimate the effect of the publication of school quality information on property prices. We use a difference-in-difference approach to estimate the causal effect of the release of information about high-quality and low-quality schools relative to mediumquality schools in the neighborhood and find that the release of information about high-quality schools increases property prices by 3.6 percent, whereas the release of information about low-quality schools has no significant effect. The findings indicate that many buyers are unaware of the relevance of school quality information and that real estate agents pursue a strategy of disclosing information about high-quality schools to increase the sales price. Results from a survey of Victorian real estate agents provide evidence in favor of this strategy.

Suggested Citation

  • Haisken-DeNew, John & Hasan, Syed & Jha, Nikhil & Sinning, Mathias, 2017. "Unawareness and selective disclosure: The effect of school quality information on property prices," Ruhr Economic Papers 667, RWI - Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-University Bochum, TU Dortmund University, University of Duisburg-Essen.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:rwirep:667
    DOI: 10.4419/86788774
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Gu, Yiquan & Rasch, Alexander & Wenzel, Tobias, 2022. "Consumer salience and quality provision in (un)regulated public service markets," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(C).
    2. Melser, Daniel & Moallemi, Morteza & Kim, Jun Sung, 2021. "Preferences for single-sex schools: Evidence from the housing market," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 189(C), pages 710-726.
    3. Daniel Broxterman & Tingyu Zhou, 2023. "Information Frictions in Real Estate Markets: Recent Evidence and Issues," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 66(2), pages 203-298, February.
    4. Deborah A. Cobb-Clark & Tiffany Ho & Nicolás Salamanca, 2021. "Parental Responses to Children’s Achievement Test Results," Melbourne Institute Working Paper Series wp2021n17, Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research, The University of Melbourne.
    5. Daniel Melser, 2023. "The housing market reaction to the combustible cladding crisis: Safety or financial concerns?," Urban Studies, Urban Studies Journal Limited, vol. 60(4), pages 620-637, March.
    6. Rajapaksa, Darshana & Gono, Marcel & Wilson, Clevo & Managi, Shunsuke & Lee, Boon & Hoang, Viet-Ngu, 2020. "The demand for education: The impacts of good schools on property values in Brisbane, Australia," Land Use Policy, Elsevier, vol. 97(C).
    7. Fan, Ying & Fu, Yuqi & Yang, Zan & Chen, Ming, 2024. "Search frictions in rental markets: Evidence from urban China," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 83(C).
    8. Kim, Hayoung, 2022. "Heterogeneous effects of information disclosure: Evidence from housing markets," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 195(C), pages 359-380.
    9. Doko Tchatoka, Firmin & Varvaris, Vanessa, 2021. "Neighbourhood, school zoning and the housing market: Evidence from New South Wales," Journal of Housing Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(C).
    10. Yuta Kuroda, 2022. "What does the disclosure of school quality information bring? The effect through the housing market," Journal of Regional Science, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 62(1), pages 125-149, January.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    school quality; housing markets; information asymmetry; public policy evaluation; difference-in-difference estimation;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D84 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Expectations; Speculations
    • I24 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Education and Inequality
    • R31 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Real Estate Markets, Spatial Production Analysis, and Firm Location - - - Housing Supply and Markets

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