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Correlated Equilibrium in Games with Incomplete Information

  • Dirk Bergemann
  • Stephen Morris

We define a notion of correlated equilibrium for games with incomplete information in a general setting with finite players, finite actions, and finite states, which we call Bayes correlated equilibrium. The set of Bayes correlated equilibria of a fixed incomplete information game equals the set of probability distributions over actions, states and types that might arise in any Bayes Nash equilibrium where players observed additional information. We show that more information always shrinks the set of Bayes correlated equilibria.

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Paper provided by David K. Levine in its series Levine's Working Paper Archive with number 786969000000000265.

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Date of creation: 20 Oct 2011
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Handle: RePEc:cla:levarc:786969000000000265
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.dklevine.com/

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  1. Cotter, Kevin D., 1991. "Correlated equilibrium in games with type-dependent strategies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 48-68, June.
  2. Andrew Caplin & Daniel Martin, 2013. "A Testable Theory of Imperfect Perception," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000649, David K. Levine.
  3. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2007. "Belief Free Incomplete Information Games," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1629, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  4. Jeffrey C. Ely & Marcin Peski, 2005. "Hierarchies of Belief and Interim Rationalizability," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000817, UCLA Department of Economics.
  5. Emir Kamenica & Matthew Gentzkow, 2009. "Bayesian Persuasion," NajEcon Working Paper Reviews 814577000000000369, www.najecon.org.
  6. Forges, Francoise & Koessler, Frederic, 2005. "Communication equilibria with partially verifiable types," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(7), pages 793-811, November.
  7. Aumann, Robert J, 1987. "Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(1), pages 1-18, January.
  8. Robert F. Nau, 1992. "Joint Coherence in Games of Incomplete Information," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 38(3), pages 374-387, March.
  9. Aumann, Robert J., 1974. "Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 67-96, March.
  10. repec:dau:papers:123456789/168 is not listed on IDEAS
  11. Myerson, Roger B., 1982. "Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 67-81, June.
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