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A Testable Theory of Imperfect Perception

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  • Andrew Caplin
  • Daniel Martin

Abstract

We provide a characterisation of choice behaviour generated by a Bayesian expected utility maximiser. The observable signature of this standard model is the impossibility of raising utility by switching wholesale from one action to another. We provide applications to robustness, to the recovery of utility from choice data and to model classification.
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Suggested Citation

  • Andrew Caplin & Daniel Martin, 2015. "A Testable Theory of Imperfect Perception," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 125(582), pages 184-202, February.
  • Handle: RePEc:wly:econjl:v:125:y:2015:i:582:p:184-202
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/ecoj.2015.125.issue-582
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Herbert A. Simon, 1955. "A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 69(1), pages 99-118.
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    6. Faruk Gul & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 2005. "Random Expected Utility," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000834, UCLA Department of Economics.
    7. Faruk Gul & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 2006. "Random Expected Utility," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 74(1), pages 121-146, January.
    8. Caplin, Andrew & Dean, Mark, 2011. "Search, choice, and revealed preference," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 6(1), January.
    9. Nicola Gennaioli & Andrei Shleifer, 2010. "What Comes to Mind," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 125(4), pages 1399-1433.
    10. Paulo Natenzon, 2019. "Random Choice and Learning," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 127(1), pages 419-457.
    11. Masatlioglu, Yusufcan & Nakajima, Daisuke, 2013. "Choice by iterative search," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 8(3), September.
    12. Richard H. Thaler, 2008. "Mental Accounting and Consumer Choice," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 27(1), pages 15-25, 01-02.
    13. Yuval Salant & Ariel Rubinstein, 2008. "(A, f): Choice with Frames -super-1," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 75(4), pages 1287-1296.
    14. Sims, Christopher A., 2003. "Implications of rational inattention," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(3), pages 665-690, April.
    15. Matthew Rabin & Georg Weizsacker, 2009. "Narrow Bracketing and Dominated Choices," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(4), pages 1508-1543, September.
    16. Haluk Ergin & Todd Sarver, 2010. "A Unique Costly Contemplation Representation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 78(4), pages 1285-1339, July.
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    18. Gottlieb, Daniel, 2014. "Imperfect memory and choice under risk," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 85(C), pages 127-158.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Carlos Alos-Ferrer & Ernst Fehr & Nick Netzer, 2018. "Time will tell - Recovering Preferences when Choices are Noisy," Papers 1811.02497, arXiv.org.
    2. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2013. "The Comparison of Information Structures in Games: Bayes Correlated Equilibrium and Individual Sufficiency," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000730, David K. Levine.
    3. Altmann, Steffen & Falk, Armin & Grunewald, Andreas, 2015. "Incentives and Information as Driving Forces of Default Effects," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 516, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
    4. Andrew Caplin & Dániel Csaba & John Leahy & Oded Nov, 2018. "Rational Inattention, Competitive Supply, and Psychometrics," NBER Working Papers 25224, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Bergemann, Dirk & Morris, Stephen, 2016. "Bayes correlated equilibrium and the comparison of information structures in games," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 11(2), May.
    6. Andrew Caplin & Mark Dean, 2015. "Revealed Preference, Rational Inattention, and Costly Information Acquisition," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 105(7), pages 2183-2203, July.
    7. Tom Cunningham & Jonathan de Quidt, 2016. "Implicit Preferences Inferred from Choice," CESifo Working Paper Series 5704, CESifo Group Munich.
    8. Lunn, Pete & Somerville, Jason J., 2015. "Surplus Identification with Non-Linear Returns," Papers WP522, Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI).
    9. Dohmen, Thomas, 2014. "Behavioral labor economics: Advances and future directions," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(C), pages 71-85.
    10. Cristina Gualdani & Shruti Sinha, 2019. "Identification and inference in discrete choice models with imperfect information," Papers 1911.04529, arXiv.org, revised Nov 2019.
    11. Andrew Caplin & Mark Dean & John Leahy, 2017. "Rationally Inattentive Behavior: Characterizing and Generalizing Shannon Entropy," NBER Working Papers 23652, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    12. Tamer Boyaci & Yalçin Akçay, 2016. "Pricing when customers have limited attention," ESMT Research Working Papers ESMT-16-01, ESMT European School of Management and Technology, revised 19 Jan 2017.
    13. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2011. "Correlated Equilibrium in Games with Incomplete Information," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1822, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    14. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2013. "Bayes Correlated Equilibrium and the Comparison of Information Structures," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000725, David K. Levine.
    15. Cunningham, Thomas, 2013. "Biases and Implicit Knowledge," MPRA Paper 50292, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    16. Caplin, Andrew, 2014. "Rational inattention and revealed preference: The data-theoretic approach to economic modeling," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(4), pages 295-305.
    17. Delavande, Adeline & Zafar, Basit, 2018. "Information and anti-American attitudes," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 149(C), pages 1-31.
    18. Martin, Daniel, 2017. "Strategic pricing with rational inattention to quality," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 131-145.
    19. Duffy, Sean & Gussman, Steven & Smith, John, 2019. "Judgments of length in the economics laboratory: Are there brains in choice?," MPRA Paper 93126, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    20. Altmann, Steffen & Falk, Armin & Grunewald, Andreas, 2013. "Incentives and Information as Driving Forces of Default Effects," IZA Discussion Papers 7610, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    21. Sandro Ambuehl, 2017. "An Offer You Can't Refuse? Incentives Change How We Inform Ourselves and What We Believe," CESifo Working Paper Series 6296, CESifo Group Munich.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D01 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles
    • D03 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Behavioral Microeconomics: Underlying Principles

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