Bayes Correlated Equilibrium and the Comparison of Information Structures
Download full text from publisher
Other versions of this item:
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2013. "Bayes Correlated Equilibrium and the Comparison of Information Structures," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1822R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
References listed on IDEAS
- Andrew Caplin & Daniel Martin, 2015.
"A Testable Theory of Imperfect Perception,"
Royal Economic Society, vol. 125(582), pages 184-202, February.
- Andrew Caplin & Daniel Martin, 2011. "A Testable Theory of Imperfect Perception," NBER Working Papers 17163, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Andrew Caplin & Daniel Martin, 2013. "A Testable Theory of Imperfect Perception," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000649, David K. Levine.
- Andrew Caplin & Daniel Martin, 2015. "A Testable Theory of Imperfect Perception," PSE - Labex "OSE-Ouvrir la Science Economique" halshs-01155313, HAL.
- FranÃ§oise Forges, 2006.
"Correlated Equilibrium in Games with Incomplete Information Revisited,"
Theory and Decision,
Springer, vol. 61(4), pages 329-344, December.
- FORGES, Françoise, 2006. "Correlated equilibrium in games with incomplete information revisited," CORE Discussion Papers 2006041, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Francoise Forges, 2006. "Correlated equilibrium in games with incomplete information revisited," Post-Print hal-00360743, HAL.
- Cotter, Kevin D., 1991. "Correlated equilibrium in games with type-dependent strategies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 48-68, June.
- Robert J. Aumann, 1995. "Repeated Games with Incomplete Information," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262011476, May.
- Neyman, Abraham, 1991. "The positive value of information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 3(3), pages 350-355, August.
- Aumann, Robert J., 1974.
"Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies,"
Journal of Mathematical Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 67-96, March.
- AUMANN, Robert J., 1974. "Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies," CORE Discussion Papers RP 167, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- R. Aumann, 2010. "Subjectivity and Correlation in Randomized Strategies," Levine's Working Paper Archive 389, David K. Levine.
- Forges, Francoise & Koessler, Frederic, 2005.
"Communication equilibria with partially verifiable types,"
Journal of Mathematical Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 41(7), pages 793-811, November.
- F. Forges & Frederic Koessler, 2003. "Communication Equilibria with Partially Verifiable Types," THEMA Working Papers 2003-10, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
- Myerson, Roger B., 1982. "Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 67-81, June.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Caplin, Andrew, 2014. "Rational inattention and revealed preference: The data-theoretic approach to economic modeling," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(4), pages 295-305.
- Kloosterman, Andrew, 2015. "Public information in Markov games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 157(C), pages 28-48.
More about this item
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2013-09-24 (All new papers)
- NEP-CTA-2013-09-24 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-GTH-2013-09-24 (Game Theory)
- NEP-MIC-2013-09-24 (Microeconomics)
StatisticsAccess and download statistics
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cla:levarc:786969000000000725. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (David K. Levine). General contact details of provider: http://www.dklevine.com/ .
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.