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Citations for "Communication equilibria with partially verifiable types"

by Forges, Francoise & Koessler, Frederic

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  1. Elchanan Ben-Porath & Barton L. Lipman, 2009. "Implementation and Partial Provability," Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series wp2009-002, Boston University - Department of Economics.
  2. repec:hal:wpaper:hal-00753473 is not listed on IDEAS
  3. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2013. "Bayes Correlated Equilibrium and the Comparison of Information Structures," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1822R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  4. Francoise Forges & Frederic Koessler, 2006. "Long Persuasion Games," THEMA Working Papers 2006-01, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
  5. Bull, Jesse & Watson, Joel, 2007. "Hard evidence and mechanism design," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 58(1), pages 75-93, January.
  6. Deneckere, Raymond & Severinov, Sergei, 2008. "Mechanism design with partial state verifiability," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 64(2), pages 487-513, November.
  7. Wagner, P.Achim, 2011. "Unmediated communication with partially verifiable types," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 99-107, January.
  8. Jeanne Hagenbach & Frédéric Koessler & Eduardo Perez-Richet, 2012. "Certifiable Pre-Play Communication: Full Disclosure," PSE Working Papers hal-00753473, HAL.
  9. Sher, Itai & Vohra, Rakesh, 2015. "Price discrimination through communication," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 10(2), May.
  10. Barton L. Lipman & Elchanan Ben-Porath, 2010. "Implementation with Partial Provability," Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series WP2010-018, Boston University - Department of Economics.
  11. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2011. "Correlated Equilibrium in Games with Incomplete Information," Working Papers 1358, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Econometric Research Program..
  12. Aurélie Slechten, 2015. "Environmental agreements under asymmetric information," Working Papers 95042257, Lancaster University Management School, Economics Department.
  13. Volker Hahn, 2010. "Sequential Aggregation of Verifiable Information," CER-ETH Economics working paper series 10/136, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research (CER-ETH) at ETH Zurich.
  14. repec:hal:wpaper:halshs-00586847 is not listed on IDEAS
  15. Ingela Alger & Régis Renault, 2007. "Screening Ethics when Honest Agents Keep their Word," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 30(2), pages 291-311, February.
  16. Elchanan Ben-Porath & Eddie Dekel & Barton L. Lipman, 2016. "Disclosure and Choice," Discussion Paper Series dp694, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
  17. Françoise Forges, 2006. "Correlated Equilibrium in Games with Incomplete Information Revisited," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 61(4), pages 329-344, December.
  18. Hedlund, Jonas, 2015. "Persuasion with communication costs," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 92(C), pages 28-40.
  19. Frédéric Koessler, 2008. "Lobbying with two audiences: Public vs private certification," Post-Print halshs-00754290, HAL.
  20. Francoise Forges, 2006. "Feasible mechanisms in economies with type-dependent endowments," Post-Print hal-00360744, HAL.
  21. Ingela Alger & Régis Renault, 2006. "Screening Ethics When Honest Agents Care About Fairness ," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 47(1), pages 59-85, 02.
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