IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/r/eee/mateco/v41y2005i7p793-811.html
   My bibliography  Save this item

Communication equilibria with partially verifiable types

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as


Cited by:

  1. Françoise Forges, 2006. "Correlated Equilibrium in Games with Incomplete Information Revisited," Theory and Decision, Springer, pages 329-344.
  2. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2011. "Correlated Equilibrium in Games with Incomplete Information," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1822, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  3. Ingela Alger & Régis Renault, 2006. "Screening Ethics When Honest Agents Care About Fairness ," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 47(1), pages 59-85, February.
  4. Fahrenberger, Theresa & Gersbach, Hans, 2007. "Legislative Process with Open Rules," CEPR Discussion Papers 6240, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  5. Bergemann, Dirk & Morris, Stephen, 2017. "Belief-free rationalizability and informational robustness," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, pages 744-759.
  6. Marc Fleurbaey & Stéphane Zuber, 2017. "Fair Utilitarianism," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-01441070, HAL.
  7. Wagner, P.Achim, 2011. "Unmediated communication with partially verifiable types," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 99-107, January.
  8. Bull, Jesse & Watson, Joel, 2007. "Hard evidence and mechanism design," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, pages 75-93.
  9. Ingela Alger & Regis Renault, 2003. "Screening Ethics when Honest Agents Keep their Word," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 562, Boston College Department of Economics, revised 09 Nov 2004.
  10. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2017. "Information Design: A Unified Perspective," Working Papers 089_2017, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Econometric Research Program..
  11. Forges, Françoise & Koessler, Frédéric, 2008. "Long persuasion games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, pages 1-35.
  12. Elchanan Ben-Porath & Eddie Dekel & Barton L. Lipman, 2014. "Disclosure and Choice," Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series WP2017-002, Boston University - Department of Economics, revised Jan 2017.
  13. Itai Sher & Rakesh Vohra, 2011. "Price Discrimination Through Communication," Discussion Papers 1536, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  14. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2013. "Bayes Correlated Equilibrium and the Comparison of Information Structures," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000725, David K. Levine.
  15. Lang, Kevin & Siniver, Erez, 2011. "Why is an elite undergraduate education valuable? Evidence from Israel," Labour Economics, Elsevier, pages 767-777.
  16. Françoise Forges, 2006. "Feasible Mechanisms in Economies with Type-Dependent Endowments," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, pages 403-419.
  17. Hedlund, Jonas, 2015. "Persuasion with communication costs," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, pages 28-40.
  18. Koessler, Frédéric, 2008. "Lobbying with two audiences: Public vs private certification," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, pages 305-314.
  19. Deneckere, Raymond & Severinov, Sergei, 2008. "Mechanism design with partial state verifiability," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, pages 487-513.
  20. Françoise Forges, 2006. "Correlated Equilibrium in Games with Incomplete Information Revisited," Theory and Decision, Springer, pages 329-344.
  21. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2017. "Belief-Free Rationalizability and Informational Robustness," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2075R2, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Nov 2017.
  22. Peleg, Bezalel & Peters, Hans, 2017. "Feasible elimination procedures in social choice: An axiomatic characterization," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 43-50.
  23. Bull, Jesse & Watson, Joel, 2007. "Hard evidence and mechanism design," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, pages 75-93.
  24. Jeanne Hagenbach & Frédéric Koessler & Eduardo Perez‐Richet, 2014. "Certifiable Pre‐Play Communication: Full Disclosure," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 82(3), pages 1093-1131, May.
  25. Ingela Alger & Régis Renault, 2007. "Screening Ethics when Honest Agents Keep their Word," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), pages 291-311.
  26. Koessler, Frédéric, 2008. "Lobbying with two audiences: Public vs private certification," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, pages 305-314.
  27. Aurélie Slechten, 2015. "Environmental agreements under asymmetric information," Working Papers 95042257, Lancaster University Management School, Economics Department.
  28. Hahn, Volker, 2011. "Sequential aggregation of verifiable information," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, pages 1447-1454.
  29. Elchanan Ben-Porath & Barton L. Lipman, 2009. "Implementation and Partial Provability," Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series wp2009-002, Boston University - Department of Economics.
  30. Sher, Itai & Vohra, Rakesh, 2015. "Price discrimination through communication," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society.
  31. Ben-Porath, Elchanan & Lipman, Barton L., 2012. "Implementation with partial provability," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, pages 1689-1724.
IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.