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Citations for "Communication equilibria with partially verifiable types"

by Forges, Francoise & Koessler, Frederic

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  1. Watson, Joel & Bull, Jesse, 2006. "Hard Evidence and Mechanism Design," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series qt7973v805, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
  2. Francoise Forges, 2006. "Feasible mechanisms in economies with type-dependent endowments," Post-Print hal-00360744, HAL.
  3. repec:hal:wpaper:halshs-00586847 is not listed on IDEAS
  4. Francoise Forges & Frédéric Koessler, 2006. "Long Persuasion Games," CESifo Working Paper Series 1669, CESifo Group Munich.
  5. Sher, Itai & Vohra, Rakesh, 2015. "Price discrimination through communication," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 10(2), May.
  6. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2011. "Correlated Equilibrium in Games with Incomplete Information," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1822, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  7. Ben-Porath, Elchanan & Lipman, Barton L., 2012. "Implementation with partial provability," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(5), pages 1689-1724.
  8. Ingela Alger & Régis Renault, 2007. "Screening Ethics when Honest Agents Keep their Word," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 30(2), pages 291-311, February.
  9. Frédéric Koessler, 2008. "Lobbying with two audiences: Public vs private certification," Post-Print halshs-00754290, HAL.
  10. Elchanan Ben-Porath & Eddie Dekel & Barton L. Lipman, 2016. "Disclosure and Choice," Discussion Paper Series dp694, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
  11. Jeanne Hagenbach & Frédéric Koessler & Eduardo Perez-Richet, 2012. "Certifiable Pre-Play Communication: Full Disclosure," PSE Working Papers hal-00753473, HAL.
  12. Françoise Forges, 2006. "Correlated Equilibrium in Games with Incomplete Information Revisited," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 61(4), pages 329-344, December.
  13. Elchanan Ben-Porath & Barton L. Lipman, 2009. "Implementation and Partial Provability," Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series wp2009-002, Boston University - Department of Economics.
  14. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2013. "Bayes Correlated Equilibrium and the Comparison of Information Structures," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000725, David K. Levine.
  15. Aurélie Slechten, 2015. "Environmental agreements under asymmetric information," Working Papers 95042257, Lancaster University Management School, Economics Department.
  16. Ingela Alger & Régis Renault, 2006. "Screening Ethics When Honest Agents Care About Fairness ," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 47(1), pages 59-85, 02.
  17. Wagner, P.Achim, 2011. "Unmediated communication with partially verifiable types," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 99-107, January.
  18. Hedlund, Jonas, 2015. "Persuasion with communication costs," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 92(C), pages 28-40.
  19. Volker Hahn, 2010. "Sequential Aggregation of Verifiable Information," CER-ETH Economics working paper series 10/136, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research (CER-ETH) at ETH Zurich.
  20. Deneckere, Raymond & Severinov, Sergei, 2008. "Mechanism design with partial state verifiability," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 64(2), pages 487-513, November.
  21. repec:hal:wpaper:hal-00753473 is not listed on IDEAS
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