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Citations for "Communication equilibria with partially verifiable types"

by Forges, Francoise & Koessler, Frederic

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  1. Jeanne Hagenbach & Frédéric Koessler, 2008. "Strategic communication networks," Working Papers halshs-00586847, HAL.
  2. Wagner, P.Achim, 2011. "Unmediated communication with partially verifiable types," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 99-107, January.
  3. Hahn, Volker, 2011. "Sequential aggregation of verifiable information," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(11), pages 1447-1454.
  4. Koessler, Frédéric, 2008. "Lobbying with two audiences: Public vs private certification," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 55(3), pages 305-314, May.
  5. Frédéric Koessler & Francoise Forges, 2008. "Long persuasion games," Post-Print hal-00360719, HAL.
  6. Elchanan Ben-Porath & Barton L. Lipman, 2009. "Implementation and Partial Provability," Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series wp2009-002, Boston University - Department of Economics.
  7. Françoise Forges, 2006. "Feasible Mechanisms in Economies with Type-Dependent Endowments," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 26(2), pages 403-419, April.
  8. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2011. "Correlated Equilibrium in Games with Incomplete Information," Working Papers 1358, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Econometric Research Program..
  9. Barton L. Lipman & Elchanan Ben-Porath, 2010. "Implementation with Partial Provability," Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series WP2010-018, Boston University - Department of Economics.
  10. Jeanne Hagenbach & Frédéric Koessler & Eduardo Perez-Richet, 2012. "Certifiable Pre-Play Communication: Full Disclosure," Working Papers hal-00753473, HAL.
  11. Jeanne Hagenbach & Frédéric Koessler & Eduardo Perez-Richet, 2014. "Certifiable Pre-Play Communication: Full Disclosure," PSE - Labex "OSE-Ouvrir la Science Economique" halshs-01053478, HAL.
  12. Elchanan Ben-Porath & Eddie Dekel & Barton L. Lipman, 2016. "Disclosure and Choice," Discussion Paper Series dp694, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
  13. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2013. "Bayes Correlated Equilibrium and the Comparison of Information Structures," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1822R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  14. Bull, Jesse & Watson, Joel, 2002. "Hard Evidence and Mechanism Design," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series qt7715f08f, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
  15. Hedlund, Jonas, 2015. "Persuasion with communication costs," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 92(C), pages 28-40.
  16. FORGES, Françoise, 2006. "Correlated equilibrium in games with incomplete information revisited," CORE Discussion Papers 2006041, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  17. Deneckere, Raymond & Severinov, Sergei, 2008. "Mechanism design with partial state verifiability," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 64(2), pages 487-513, November.
  18. Aurélie Slechten, 2015. "Environmental agreements under asymmetric information," Working Papers 95042257, Lancaster University Management School, Economics Department.
  19. Ingela Alger & Régis Renault, 2006. "Screening Ethics When Honest Agents Care About Fairness ," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 47(1), pages 59-85, 02.
  20. Itai Sher & Rakesh Vohra, 2011. "Price Discrimination Through Communication," Discussion Papers 1536, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  21. Ingela Alger & Régis Renault, 2007. "Screening Ethics when Honest Agents Keep their Word," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 30(2), pages 291-311, February.
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