Unmediated communication with partially verifiable types
Abstract This paper studies unmediated communication with partially verifiable types in N-player games of incomplete information. I show that with five or more players, all outcomes that are feasible with the help of a mediator can also be achieved with direct communication between players if verifiable information can be encrypted. Without encryption, the set of equilibrium outcomes attainable with direct communication is generally strictly smaller than the set of mediated equilibrium outcomes, independent of the number of players in the game.
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References listed on IDEAS
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