Feasible Mechanisms in Economies with Type-Dependent Endowments
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- Francoise Forges, 2006. "Feasible mechanisms in economies with type-dependent endowments," Post-Print hal-00360744, HAL.
References listed on IDEAS
- Forges, Francoise & Minelli, Enrico, 2001.
"A Note on the Incentive Compatible Core,"
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- F. Forges & E. Minelli, 1999. "A note on the incentive compatible core," THEMA Working Papers 99-02, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
- FORGES, FranÃ§oise & MINELLI, Enrico, 2001. "A note on the incentive compatible core," CORE Discussion Papers RP 1523, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Andrew Postlewaite, 1979. "Manipulation via Endowments," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 46(2), pages 255-262.
- Jerry R. Green & Jean-Jacques Laffont, 1986. "Partially Verifiable Information and Mechanism Design," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 53(3), pages 447-456.
- Forges, Francoise & Koessler, Frederic, 2005.
"Communication equilibria with partially verifiable types,"
Journal of Mathematical Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 41(7), pages 793-811, November.
- F. Forges & Frederic Koessler, 2003. "Communication Equilibria with Partially Verifiable Types," THEMA Working Papers 2003-10, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
- Johnson, Scott & Pratt, John W & Zeckhauser, Richard J, 1990. "Efficiency Despite Mutually Payoff-Relevant Private Information: The Finite Case," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(4), pages 873-900, July.
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- repec:dau:papers:123456789/5452 is not listed on IDEAS
- McLean, Richard P. & Postlewaite, Andrew, 2003.
"Informational size, incentive compatibility, and the core of a game with incomplete information,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 222-241, October.
- Richard P. McLean & Andrew Postlewaite, 2001. "Informational Size, Incentive Compatibility and the Core of a Game with Incomplete Information," Penn CARESS Working Papers b52ac626d6631b39913783700, Penn Economics Department.
More about this item
- C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
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