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Strategic Sample Selection

Author

Listed:
  • Di Tillio, Alfredo
  • Ottaviani, Marco
  • Sorensen, Peter Norman

Abstract

What is the impact of sample selection on the inference payoff of an evaluator testing a simple hypothesis based on the outcome of a location experiment? We show that anticipated selection locally reduces noise dispersion and thus increases informativeness if and only if the noise distribution is double logconvex, as with normal noise. The results are applied to the analysis of strategic sample selection by a biased researcher and extended to the case of uncertain and unanticipated selection. Our theoretical analysis offers applied research a new angle on the problem of selection in empirical studies, by characterizing when selective assignment based on untreated outcomes benefits or hurts the evaluator.

Suggested Citation

  • Di Tillio, Alfredo & Ottaviani, Marco & Sorensen, Peter Norman, 2017. "Strategic Sample Selection," CEPR Discussion Papers 12202, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:12202
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Müller, Samuel & Rufibach, Kaspar, 2008. "On the max-domain of attraction of distributions with log-concave densities," Statistics & Probability Letters, Elsevier, vol. 78(12), pages 1440-1444, September.
    2. John K.-H. Quah & Bruno Strulovici, 2009. "Comparative Statics, Informativeness, and the Interval Dominance Order," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 77(6), pages 1949-1992, November.
    3. Emeric Henry & Marco Ottaviani, 2019. "Research and the Approval Process: The Organization of Persuasion," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 109(3), pages 911-955, March.
    4. Aleksey Tetenov, 2016. "An economic theory of statistical testing," CeMMAP working papers CWP50/16, Centre for Microdata Methods and Practice, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
    5. Emeric Henry, 2009. "Strategic Disclosure of Research Results: The Cost of Proving Your Honesty," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 119(539), pages 1036-1064, July.
    6. Mike Felgenhauer & Elisabeth Schulte, 2014. "Strategic Private Experimentation," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 6(4), pages 74-105, November.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Comparison of experiments; Dispersion; Persuasion; Strategic selection; welfare;

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C90 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - General
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

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